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M. P. Ellinghaus*
"You just don't see much good legislation any more."
Lester Maddox"
Introduction
Section 2-302 of the Uniform Commercial Code,' which might be
considered at first sight to be the very quintessence of progress in mat-
ters of sales law, has in fact received something less than universal
approbation.2 Even its presumed chief draftsman3 seems in the end to
have had only half a fondness for it. Its most substantial and trenchant
critic concludes that the section amounts to no more than "an emotion-
ally satisfying incantation," abstracted to the point of meaningless, and
that it provides for draftsmen the valuable lesson that "it is easy to say
nothing with words."4 As these remarks suggest, the criticism most
generally levelled against Section 2-302 is that the test of "unconscion-
ability" which it prescribes is without certain or meaningful content,
and that its application is, therefore, likely to result in harm rather
than good.
This article makes no attempt to deal with all of the substantial body
of literature concerned, in general as well as in more specific ways, with
the problems of unconscionability.5 Out of the conviction that provi-
0 Senior Lecturer in Law, University of Melbourne. LL.B. 1964, Melbourne.
t- N.Y. Times Magazine, Nov. 24, 1968, at 141.
1. Section 2-502. Unconscionable Contract or Clause.
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the contract
to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to enforce
the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable
clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any
unconscionable result.
(2) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or any clause thereof
may be unconscionable the parties shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present
evidence as to its commercial setting, purpose and effect to aid the court in making the
determination.
2. See the citations in Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-The Emperor's New
Clause, 115 U. PA. L. Rav. 485, 486 n.5 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Leff]. Comment. Defi-
nition and Interpretation of Unconscionable Contracts (Uniform Commercial Code). 58
Dica. L. Rav. 161 (1954); Comment, Policing Contracts Under the Commerdal Code, 18
U. Cm. L. Rav. 146 (1950).
3. The drafting of the Sales Article, as of other portions of the Code, is attributed to
many hands. Leff 488 n.11. It is not unreasonable, however, to see the hand of LUewellyn
writ large over Section 2-502 (except for subsection 2, which can be traced with cer-
tainty to Professor Braucher).
4. Leff 558-59.
5. Among the many materials which I have, by and large. omitted from careful
consideration is the Uniform Consumer Credit Code, which, apart from many other pro.
visions of relevance to the present topic, has its own unconscionability provisions, e.g.,
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sions like Section 2-302 are vastly useful, and indeed essential if the
common law of contracts6 is to survive in modern times, I have at-
tempted to show, by means more analytical than agglomerative, that
criticism directed against the Section's draftsmen in terms of "abstrac-
tion" and "meaninglessness" is misconceived ab initio, and that the
standard of "conscionability" is in fact proving to be a workable oneJ
I should, however, make it clear from the outset that I make no at-
tempt to offer a "theory" or "definition" of "unconscionability." In-
deed, the first section of the article is specifically concerned with estab-
lishing the proposition that the nature of Section 2-302 makes it in-
appropriate to ask for such a theory or definition." This is not to say, of
course, that all discussion of the "meaning" of unconscionability is
beside the point. The major portion of this article seeks to bring to
light such concreteness as may be elicited from the words of the statute,
the cases, and other relevant sources. It will be contended that in most
areas some minimal clarity is achievable without straying too far into
the realm of unmitigated speculation.
For the sake of structural clarity I set out at this point the major
headings under which the remainder of my discussion is organized:
I. Preliminary Considerations ........................... 759
II. The "Meaning" of Unconscionability .................. 761
A. Matters Touching Freedom of Assent .............. 762
1. Professor Lefi's Argument ..................... 762
2. Misleading Bargaining Conduct ................ 763
3. Inequality of Bargaining Position ............... 765
4. Exploitation of the Underprivileged ............. 768
§§ 5.106, 6.111 (Revised Final Draft 1968). See, e.g., Bailey, The Substantive Provisions ol
the Uniform Consumer Credit Code: 20th Century Consumer Protection in a Fred
Enterprise System, 29 OHIo ST. L.J. 597, 621 n.159 (1968).
6. The Sales Article of the Code (if not others) must, of course, be understood as
one stage in the organic development of the law of sales. Its many innovative pro-
visions are hardly conceivable without due tender of obeisance to "the undying succession
of the Great Commercial Judges whose work across the centuries has given living body,
toughness and inspiration to the Grand Tradition of the Common Law." K. LLEWELLYN,
THE COMMON LAW TRADITION at v (1960).
7. No systematic examination of Section 2-302 has yet been made from such a point
of view. Some attempt to deal with its critics in the light of decided cases is made In
Shulkin, Unconscionability-The Code, The Court and the Consumer, 9 B.C. IND. & COMMa.
L. RFv. 367 (1968), but the approach there is more chronological than analytic. Davenport,
Unconscionability and the Uniform Commercial Code, 22 U. MIAMI L. REv. 121 (1967)
contains much valuable matter, although it is handicapped by its avowed determination
"to demonstrate that Section 2-302 introduces nothing really new and is substantially
a restatement of common law," id. 123, as well as by its adherence to a dichotomous
categorization of unconscionability in terms of "oppression" and "unfair surprise."
8. See also Peters, Remedies for Breach of Contracts Relating to the Sale of Goods
Under the Uniform Commercial Code: A Roadmap for Article Two, 73 YALE L.J. 199,
202-03 n.10 (1963).
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B. "Substantive" Unconscionability ................... 773
1. The Question of Insulation .................... 773
2. "Overall Imbalance" . ......................... 775
3. Component Unconscionability .................. 786
a. Excessive Price ............................ 787
b. Warranty Disclaimers and Remedy Limitations 793
c. Other Specific Clauses ...................... 803
III. Going Beyond Sales ................................. 808
IV. The Hearing Provision .............................. 812
V. Conclusion ......................................... 814
I. Preliminary Considerations
The legal consequences which Section 2-302 prescribes attach or do
not attach, as the case may be, according to a finding in terms of "un-
conscionability." It will at once be apparent that we are confronted
here with something Pound would have termed a "standard" (in con-
trast to a "rule," "principle," or "conception")., The function of "stan-
dards" in the law is closely (though not perhaps exclusively) tied to the
maintenance of "residual categories":
Every system, including both its theoretical propositions and its
main relevant empirical insights, may be visualized as an illum-
inated spot enveloped by darkness. The logical name for the dark-
ness is, in general, "residual categories."...
If, as is almost always the case, not all of the actually observable
facts of the field, or those which have been observed, fit into the
sharply, positively defined categories, they tend to be given one
or more blanket names which refer to categories negatively de-
fined .... 10
The maintenance of such residual categories-"reasonableness." "due
care," and "good faith""1 are obvious if maximally dissimilar examples
-is essential to the well-being of any system, and serves to counteract
its inherent tendency to become logically closed.' The very essence of
those standards here under discussion is to be found in their residual
9. Pound, The Theory of Judicial Decision, 36 HARv. L. Rrv. 641, 645-46 (1923).
10. T. PARSONS, THE STRUCTURE OF SOCIAL ACTION 17 (1937).
11. See Summers, "Good Faith" in General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of
the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. Rxv. 195 (1968) ("good faith" as an "excluder");
Kessler & Fine, Culpa in Contrahendo, Bargaining in Good Faith, and Freedom of Con.
tract: A Comparative Study, 77 HARv. L. REv. 401, 449 (1964). Consider also that mean-
ingless term "equity," which has come to serve not only as a functioning standard in
particular situations but as the label for a whole system of rules, principles, conceptions
and standards.
12. T. PAmssos, supra note 10, at 17.
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quality. It is true, of course, that the task of scientific inquiry is to
carve out from the outer darkness such solid substance as has been
made accessible by the progress of empirical insight. But that task
must proceed in the knowledge-must, in fact, take as its fundamental
premise-that the terrain to be explored is illimitable in extent.
In the sense, then, that "unconscionability" by its very nature en-
compassed a world both shadowy and without bounds, its "content"
is illusory. But that is not the reproach it might seem. As Professor
Stone, who has devoted considerable attention to the problem of illu-
soriness in this connection has said:
What needs bringing home, especially as the illusory categories
themselves are increasingly recognized, is how endemic or chronic(or we should perhaps say, how "normal") a part of the appellate
judicial process they really are.13
The role played by such categories is, as Stone says elsewhere, by no
means wholly negative:
They may serve, even while imaginative judicial innovation is
proceeding, to give to the legal craftsman a certain assurance aris-
ing from the belief that innovations are but a rediscovery of or
an inference from existing legal norms. We cannot, accordingly,
dismiss the illusory categories as mere irrelevancies to what really
goes on in judicial development of the law. We may have to see
their use as an organic part of the traditional techniques. . . . In
short, the illusory categories may be resorted to, not because they
are believed to determine creative decision-making, but because
they are felt, often instinctively, to enable the content of legal
norms to change while ensuring that the legal order continues as
an unbroken unity.14
I do not for a moment suggest that the commentator's job is done
when he has made the points so far made. But a strict distinction must
be drawn between the nature of his task and that of the draftsman.
The latter's vulnerability lies in this: he may be accused of having
chosen to fling into the fray a "residual category" at a time when (or
in a place where) it has not yet become clear that the disparate phe-
nomena intended to be embraced by that category are in fact usefully
subsumable in such a way.15 But he is not to be attacked because he
chose to insist on the essential qualities of the tool which he was wield-
13. J. STONE, LEGAL SYSTEM AND LAWYERS' REASONINGS 2-3 (1964).
14. Id. 25.
15. Whether the draftsman's timing came off in the present instance is a question now
adjudicable at least to some degree by reference to recent cases which have utilized
Section 2-302-an advantage not, of course, available to Professor Left and others who
have gone before.
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ing-which in this case go by adjectival labels such as "residual" and
"illusory."'16 Whether the draftsmen of Section 2-302 were the victims
or (as this article contends) the promoters of the illusion is ultimately
of no consequence. Their language is, in any case, suffused by a wholly
admirable spirit of tautology, and splendidly productive of that "cer-
tain assurance" referred to by Professor Stone.1' Thus to say, as Profes-
sor Leff does, that ever since 1952 unconscionability has been "defined
in terms of itself"' s is, from the present perspective, a less telling point
than might at first appear.
Let it be clear that the difference between an attitude such as that
of Professor Leff and the view here expounded is, at bottom, one merely
of approach. It is a difference, nevertheless, which seems to me impor-
tant. To criticize the draftsman for failing to accomplish that which he
did not set out to accomplish is, in the first place, unfair to him. More
important, too much emphasis on the illusory nature of the "content"
of unconscionability means that those matters which are not beyond
the range of discovery are left underinvestigated. Most important of
all, such an overemphasis is calculated to discourage the courts from
discharging the function of reasoned and creative exegesis and imple-
mentation which Section 2-302 so obviously (because necessarily) en-
trusts to them.
II. The "Meaning" of Unconscionability
The assertion that Section 2-302 supplies a "standard" and thereby
constitutes an invitation to judicial creativity is not, of course, proof
that such a tactic was necessarily well-chosen. We have now, however,
a sufficient body of case-law making explicit reference to the section
to make possible some estimate, however tentative, of the practical
working of "unconscionability." By and large it may be asserted that
the direction and the pace of territorial expansion have been judi-
ciously fixed upon; it must be conceded, however, that the means of
occupation have on occasion been unnecessarily haphazard. Although
the results of the cases have more often than not a ring of conviction
about them, the reasoning in support has frequently shown a want
of analytical rigor.19
16. Cf. Professor LefF's complaint that the abstractness of the final form of
Section 2-802 renders the provision meaningless and lacking in "reality referents." Leff 558.
17. P. 760 supra.
18. Left 499.
19. Most of the opinions involved have been trial court products, which may be
much of the story. It is not dear, however, why appeals have been so infrequent. Prag-
matism suggests that litigants may often have been impecunious-but that is typically true
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The discussion which follows, while it focuses primarily on those
cases which have so far utilized Section 2-302, seeks to incorporate as
well both the cases provided as points of compass by Comment I of
the Section itself, and a variety of other relevant authorities. Since the
typical case is concerned with an amalgam of matters which are, for
the sake of analysis, segregated below, the usual warning must be given
that to this extent schematization is artificial. Nor can it be maintained,
of course, that the distinctions between the various categories adopted
below are ultimately so clear-cut as to allow of no overlap.
A. Matters Touching Freedom of Assent
The circumstances which militate against free assent and which may,
therefore, call into question the procedural 20 conscionability of an
agreement can be dichotomously arranged with the help of the ap-
proximate labels "misleading bargaining conduct" and "inequality of
bargaining position."21
1. Professor Leff's Argument
It is Professor Leff's view that in attempting to deal with "proce-
dural" unconscionability the draftsman had a duty to define, as clearly
as possible, the bargaining elements which will make a contract "open
to judicial rewriting," or, alternatively, which "will permit scrutiny
for unconscionability."22 In reverse form, the question is simply that of
"insulation": may the parties, by a sufficient compliance with the pro-
prieties of bargaining, insulate the contract from judicial intervention
on the ground of "substantive" unconscionability? If so, what degree
of bargaining unfairness must be shown before that insulation melts
away?
The proper place for a discussion of this very legitimate problem is
elsewhere; it is a part of the topic of "substantive" unconscionability
of only one party, generally the winning one. I should like to think that the lack of
appeals is in itself a vindication, of a sort, of the draftsman's design; but a less sanguine
temperament might, of course, be inclined to single out the generally moderate amounts
at stake, as well as a degree of nervousness on the part of counsel which perhaps cor-
responds to that manifested by the commentators. (Such a nervousness is not, be it noted,
necessarily unwholesome in its implications: tremors, too, may be conceived of as part
of the grand design.)
20. Professor Leff distinguishes between bargaining aspects and substantive aspects
of unconscionability by labelling the former "procedural"-perhaps unhappily so, but
I have accepted the usage for simplicity's sake.
21. An amalgamation of the two categories will, however, intrude at a later stage, as
a result of the necessary recognition of a judicial trend towards regarding as sul generis
contracts involving the participation of low-income consumers, of which more is said
below.
22. Leff 504 (emphasis added).
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itself, of the question: How far does the power of the court to find such
unconscionability extend? What is important here is that this problem
must be distinguished carefully from the one presently in issue, which
is not what level of bargaining conduct permits scrutiny for uncon-
scionability (or, conversely, insulates against such scrutiny), but rather,
and very differently, what level of bargaining unfairness (if any) is
sufficient to entitle a court to refuse to enforce a contract for uncon-
scionability even where the terms of the contract are not in themselves
unconscionable? Professor Leff, it seems to me, does not make this
distinction dearly, and the result is confusion. The former question,
it will be seen later, is admittedly incapable of being answered with
precision, and this is so for what seem to the present writer good and
substantial reasons.2 The latter question, on the other hand, required
-as will be submitted below-no particular attention from the drafts-
men of Section 2-302, in view of case doctrine already available in the
field.
2. Misleading Bargaining Conduct
The traditional means of dealing with the problems of misleading
bargaining conduct are familiar and diverse. Fraud, misrepresentation,
mistake, and the like are all relevant here in ways too self-evident to
justify elaboration. The adequacy of developed doctrine was perhaps
called into question for a time by the advent of the form contract, but
it seems hardly open to dispute that this challenge had been met with-
out serious dislocations by the time the Uniform Commercial Code
began to be enacted in the various states. The courts had shown them-
selves quite capable of dealing with matters of unread, fine, or other-
wise inaccessible print and so on, entirely in terms of the competing
categories of the traditional doctrines of assent and interpretation.
24
According to these doctrines, moreover, a sufficiency of deception may
in itself, without more, be enough to absolve the promisor from all
(or any particular) obligation.
"Unconscionability," therefore, while it clearly embraces this field,
serves, with respect to it, at least on one level primarily by way of dec-
23. I discuss the problem of insulation, and give the "good and substantial reasons"
referred to, under the heading "The Question of Insulation," pp. 773-75 infra.
24. See, e.g., New Prague Flouring Mill Co. v. Spears, 194 Iowa 417. 189 N.W. 815
(1922); Arthur Philip Export Corp. v. Leathertone Inc., 275 App. Div. 102. 87 N.YS.2d
665 (1949); Wholey Boiler Works v. Lewis, 45 R.I. 441, 123 A. 595 (1924); and cases cited
and discussed in Davenport, supra note 7, at 13842; 1 A. CORuIN. CON'r SAr § 128 (193);
3 id. §§ 559, 606, 614 (1963). Section 1-103 of the Uniform Commercial Code [hereinafter
UCC] preserves resort to "Supplementary General Principles of Law" where not "dis.
placed" by particular provisions of the Code.
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oration. The simplest answer to charges that the section fails to make
clear what kinds of bargaining conduct are unconscionable, and that
the official comment cases fail 25 to do more than "illustrate what kind
of bargaining procedure will not serve to insulate a contract from gut-
ting pursuant to Section 2-302,126 is, therefore, that the major thrust of
Section 2-302 is simply in another direction (that of "substantive" un-
conscionability),27 and that its relative inattention2s to bargaining
matters was justified in the light of developed judicial doctrine.
If a demand for dramatic focus nevertheless be made, Comment 1
surely supplies it by incorporating the phrase "unfair surprise."29 Pro-
fessor Leff suggests30 that the utility of the phrase is diminished or de-
stroyed by the introduction, in 1952, of the reference to clauses "so
one-sided as to be unconscionable" (this being a definition of uncon-
scionability "in terms of itself"),31 and by the addition in the same year
of the word "oppression," which by constituting another dimension of
unconscionability, represents a further dilution.32 One has here, I
think, a good instance of the all-or-nothing approach which character-
ized the major portion of Professor Leff's commentary. If there is to be
a reference to "unfair surprise," then that reference must stand craggily
alone, sole monarch of the realm: any attempt to supply chiaroscuro is
obfuscation.
Still, if the question is asked: What does Section 2-302 add to the
techniques already available for dealing with deceptive bargaining
practices, then it must be answered: nothing much except a greater
possibility of overtness in place of covertness.3a Most cases so far de-
25. As they dearly do: see Professor Left's convincing argument. Left 502-04.
26. Id. 503.
27. See Section B infra.
28. It ought to be remembered that where matters of fine print and the like arc ofspecial relevance, the Code usually lays down explicit standards. See, e.g., UCC § 2-316(2).
29. "The principle is one of the prevention of oppression and unfair surprise ....UCC § 2-302, Comment 1. I suggest below that "surprise" was intended by the draftsmanto have the primary function of delimiting a species of substantive unconscionabillty,but there is no reason why it should not be utilized in the present context. That it




32. Id. 499-500. The introduction of "oppression" is troublesome apparently becauseits content cannot be specifically assigned to either the procedural or substantive aspects
of unconscionability; with respect to the former, it raises further doubts, according toProfessor Left, about the "insulation" issue to be discussed below.
33. Compare Professor Left's conclusion, invoking Llewellyn's famous dictum, thatthe total effect of Section 2-302 is just the opposite. Left 559; cf. note 270 infra. My pointis simply that the court may find it congenial squarely to label as "unconscionable" that
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cided under Section 2-302 have involved "form" contracts, but the fact
is as often ignored as commented upon.34
On another level, the section is also perhaps encouraging the courts
to use language, which, though it constitutes in the first place a re-
sponse to bargaining matters, has nevertheless profounder implications:
language which reflects the broad trend of our times toward a far-reach-
ing socialization of the law of contracts. It is not difficult to see that,
quite apart from factors such as lack of educations which may in given
situations diminish the understanding of one of the bargaining parties,
even the man of solid bourgeois accomplishments (who is presumably
the anthropormorphic norm here) may often in these times be over-
whelmed by incomprehension, or at least unconquerable ennui, in the
face of lengthy columns of finely-honed lawyers' language. It may be
that we are at the point of adopting the principle that under certain
circumstances it is simply "unconscionable," within the meaning of
Section 2-302, to rely on print as a means of communication (and there-
fore as a means of defining the ambit of assent); more may be necessary
by way of detailed and comprehensive disclosure.30
3. Inequality of Bargaining Position
As in the case of misleading bargaining conduct, the nature of this
problem, too, has been familiar for a considerable time, and questions
which would formerly have been neutrally referred to as preventing "agreement" or
"consensus ad idem."
34. In American Home Improvement, Inc. v. MacIver, 105 N.H. 435. 201 A.2d 886
(1964), for instance, the court might conceivably have made something of tie apparent
complexities of the printed forms involved, but concentrated on excessiveness of price
instead. In those cases in which the standard form aspect is singled out for attention.
the decision might well have been supported by arguments making no reference, as to
this point, to Section 2-302. See, e.g., David v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 4
U.C.C. REP. SERv. 1145 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1968) (clause waiving right to a civil jury, printed
in fine print on a "signature card" apparently non-contractual in nature); Zabriskie
Chevrolet, Inc. v. Smith, 99 N.J. Super. 441, 240 A.2d 195 (1968). where ie court, in
holding a warranty disclaimer a la Henningsen unconscionable by invocation of that
case and of Section 2-302, puts the issue of "fine print" in terms of Section 2.-316(2): and
the dissent of Gibson, P.J., in State Bank of Albany v. Hickey, 29 App. Div. 2d 993. 288
N.Y.S.2d 980 (1968), which insists on the unenforceability of a guarantee contained in a
finely-printed document of "circuitous structure," couched in "laboured and redundant
language," on the basis of "ambiguity" (presumably according to the maxim of interpre-
tation contra proferentem), although the majority opinion discusses the issue in terms of
Section 2-302.
35. See p. 770 infra.
36. Coming to meet us here from the opposite direction is, of course, the expanding
notion of strict tort liability, which in one important respect has already absorbed into
its territory an area no doubt originally conceived of as comprised within the sphere of
operation of Section 2-302: the area of manufacturers' liability for defective products. I
take it that extensive citation is superfluous. See, e.g., Prosser, The Assault Upon the
Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE .J. 1099 (1960); Prosser, The Fall
of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REv. 791 (19G6).
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of "adhesion," in particular, have been extensively canvassed in the
literature.37 The relevance of the respective bargaining positions of
the parties to the issue of unconscionability is beyond dispute, s al-
though to ask the draftsman for a comprehensive statement of the pre-
cise nature and scope of this relevance is, as we have argued above, mis-
guided. One might, however, fairly demand of him that he should give
some indication of the degree of emphasis which is to be placed on the
factor of bargaining power. And Section 2-302 provides a very real clue
here: the principle is, says Comment 1, one of prevention of oppression
and unfair surprise, "and not of disturbance of allocation of risks be-
cause of superior bargaining power."3 9 These words are no doubt not
as ideally clear as might be wished for by some commentators, but they
do, it is submitted, almost certainly mean that mere disparity of bar-
gaining strength, without more, is not enough to make out a case of
unconscionability. Just because the contract I signed was proffered to
me by Almighty Monopoly Incorporated does not mean that I may
37. I think the ritual of listing the usual array of pieces by Dawson, Ehrenzwig,
Kessler, et al., may be dispensed with nowadays. For a compendium of thinking on the
matter, see Patterson, The Interpretation and Construction of Contracts, 64 COLtM. L.
REv. 833, 855-62 (1964). This invaluable article touches on many points of general rele-
vance to the present essay. Cf. Eisenberg, Let the Seller Beware: A New Concept unde
the UCC, 72 Com. L.J. 349 (1967), which I cite only, however, for the suggestiveness of
its title.
So far as the case law is concerned, it should be noted that Professor Leff goes some
lengths to establish the inapplicability of equity decisions both to this area and to
matters of bargaining conduct. I deal with his argument here because the equity cases
seem on the whole to be worried predominantly about certain classes of persons whose
most egregious common attribute--if real or presumptive idiocy is put to one side-seems
to be weakness of bargaining strength. Professor Leff concedes that the equity cases offer
a "whole universe of kinds of bargaining which . . . will support a refusal specifically to
enforce it," Leff 531; but for two reasons no comfort may, in his view, be derived from
them guand meme; first, they are prototypically concerned with property transactions(essentially dissimilar, he argues, from the sale of goods), and second, their "dramatic
situations" offer, as already intimated, quintessentially the spectacle of a large variety of
"presumptive sillies"-sailors, heirs, farmers, women, illiterates, drunkards, etc., etc.-
situations which are "exceedingly unlikely to be reproduced in the Sales context." Id.
532-33. To utilize Professor Leff's splendid aphorism: "Equity dealt with the pathology
of bargaining. The Code deals with the pathology of nonbargaining." Id. 537.
It is difficult not to feel that this position is somewhat overstated; by hypothesis, the
use of analogy does not, after all, depend on the very closest degree of affinity between
subject and analogue. For instance, to the extent to which Section 2-302 has induced
recognition of the underprivileged consumer, there is a clear analogy to equitable
recognition of the "presumptive silly" (impolitic as that point may seem). A thorough
investigation of the equity cases would be a major task of scholarship, and is beyond the
scope of this article.
38. Some ingenious footwork in connection with the phrase "unfair surprise" enables
the writer of Comment, Bargaining Power and Unconscionability: A Suggested Approach
to UCC Section 2-302, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 998 (1966), to conclude that the application of
the section is to be "limited to those contracts whose unfairness arises from unequal
bargaining power between the parties." Id. 999 (emphasis added). In view of the cases
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subsequently argue exemption from any or all obligation: at the very
least, some element of deception or substantive unfairness must pre-
sumably be shown. If this interpretation is correct, therefore, it is
dear that inequality of bargaining position (unlike deceptive bargain-
ing conduct) is not, even potentially, enough per se to justify judicial
intervention under Section 2-302. The cases seem to support this
view.40
If, in the further pursuit of precision, we now ask ourselves: What
precisely is "inequality of bargaining position"?, it must be answered
that a comprehensive and detailed description is as impossible as it
is undesirable. It may, however, be said that traditional usage embodies
the notion of a disparity of status as opposed to a disparity which is the
product of a particular contingency. The bargain is the occasion on
which Wotan and Alberich-merchant and consumer, corporation and
individual, and so on-meet and draw apart, each conceived of as a
representative of a statically different order.4' But it should not be lost
sight of that there are also bargains struck between seeming equals
which, on closer investigation, turn out to be lopsided because of par-
ticular circumstances of the case. Even Alberich may possess the Ring,
if only for a time. A recurring situation of this kind is that of the near-
insolvent business forced to look for last-minute financial relief to those
who, well aware of the opportunity for gain thus provided, are willing
to lend only on terms extravagantly advantageous to themselves. Fi-
nancing agreements are, of course, prima facie beyond the scope of the
Code's Sales Article, but an attempt to apply Section 2-302 to such an
agreement was nevertheless made in In re Matter of Elkins-Dell Man-
ufacturing Co.4 There a referee in bankruptcy held that a contract
under the terms of which the lender had no real obligation to advance
40. See, e.g., the Paragon Homes litigation, discussed pp. 803-04 injra, where the
court, although it took note of the fact that the cases did not involve "parties situated
on an equal basis" (home owner v. construction company), stressed also that the clause
in question had been inserted into the contract "for the purpose of harassing and
embarrassing the defendants"; David v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co.. 4 UCC RE.P.
SERV. 1145 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1968) where, although some emphasis is placed on quasi.adhesive
elements (bank v. private customer), more is made of matters involving deceptive
bargaining conduct. See also Sinkoff Beverage Co. v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co. 51 Misc. 2d
446, 448, 273 N.Y.S.2d 364, 366 (1966): Section 2-302 is not directed "against the conse-
quences of uneven bargaining positions." (For criticism of this otherwise very badly
argued judgment, see note 256 infra.)
It will be seen that my discussion of each "component" of unconscionability seeks to
suggest an answer to the question whether that component is per se at least potentially
capable of sustaining a finding of unconscionability.
41. The dangers of a rigid adherence to this approach are spectacularly demonstrated
by Sinkoff v. Schlitz Brewing Co., 51 Misc. 2d 446, 273 N.Y.S.2d 364 (1966). See note 254
infra.
42. 253 F. Supp. 864 (E.D. Pa. 1966). For a fuller discussion of this case see pp. 782-84
infra.
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funds, while the borrower submitted to almost total economic enslave-
ment, was unconscionable, and confined the lender's recovery to the
legal rate of interest although the borrower, as a corporation, was
deprived by statute of the defense of usury. On petition for review, the
federal district court declined to express its view as to whether Section
2-302 might be extended to financing agreements of the kind before it,
but held that, in any case, analogous principles of equity demanded
that a hearing of the kind contemplated by Section 2-302(2) be held in
order to determine the commercial context of the case and its implica-
tions.
Whether or not Section 2-302 be applied outside the law of sales,
however, the pressures of financial difficulty are clearly of potential
relevance within the sales context. Either seller or buyer may submit
to unusually onerous terms because of the prospect of impending bank-
ruptcy. In such circumstances the court ought, by way of analogy to
Elkins-Dell, to look beyond any nominal parity of status of the parties
to the reality of the situation. And the considerations relevant to in-
solvency situations ought to be applicable, mutatis mutandum, to other
situations in which unusual pressures are being brought to bear on
one of the parties not by a divergence of status but by the contingen-
cies of the moment.
43
4. Exploitation of the Underprivileged44
That a significant stratum of American society is composed of those
whose income is sufficiently negligible or sporadic to warrant their
being labelled "poor" is a fact to which nowadays no particular atten-
tion need be drawn. That one of the incidents of poverty is a tendency
to fall victim (usually by way of the installment contract) to purchase
commitments entered into over-optimistically is also sufficiently ob-
vious. That those commitments are often made under pressure of un-
scrupulous salesmanship, and that their terms are usually heavily
weighted in favor of the merchant-supplier, is presumably no news to
anybody, either. In this area insufficiency of understanding and ine-
quality of bargaining power play an intertwined role and are jointly
traceable to features of the context (that is to say, the disadvantages of
the purchaser's station) which on that account deserve to be institu-
tionalized.
43. The contractor-subcontractor or general bidder-subbidder sittiatlis come to tnind
as other examples of situations involving particular pressure on one party If deadlines
or outstanding commitments have to be met.
44. Cf. Wright, The Courts Have Failed the Poor, N.Y. Times, Mard 9, 1969, § 6
(Magazine), at 26.
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The most immediately relevant questions here seem to be: (1)
According to whose susceptibilities must the degree of communica-
tional clarity required by the law (especially of the standard form con-
tract) be adjusted-those of the "reasonable" or "average" man (who,
as we have said elsewhere, is presumably a staunch bourgeois)-or must
some lower common denominator be kept in view? (2) How signifi-
cant is the seller's knowledge that the consumer cannot afford the pur-
chases contracted for by him?
The problem of the particularly susceptible consumer is, of course,
an old one, not only in the law of contracts, and we have no doubt
come a long way from the views once prevalent with respect to it. The
sensible answer is, surely, that the particular character of the consumer
in question, or, at the very least, the class of consumers with which
dealing was or should have been contemplated, cannot be left out of
account. In Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co. the court put
the test in this way: "Did each party to the contract, considering his
obvious education or lack of it, have a reasonable opportunity to under-
stand the terms of the contract, . . ?"4 Under this formula, the seller
acts at his peril, at least in the sphere of ordinary consumer transac-
tions, unless he uses "language that the least educated person can un-
derstand."
That he do so was demanded by the court in the ITM1 case,47 in
which the Attorney-General of New York sought an injunction against
a so-called "referral" or "endless chain" sales plan, misrepresented to
customers as a money-making scheme from which they could make
thousands of dollars. Concomitant with enrollment the customer was
required to enter into an installment contract for the purchase of a
household appliance at an exorbitant price. A "literal cascade of mis-
leading statements and misrepresentations" issued from the promoters
of the plan. The court held, not surprisingly, that the Attorney-Gen-
eral "not only had the right, but the most imperative duty, to bring
this action," and issued the injunction prayed for.48 Beyond this, how-
45. 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. (1965)). See Wright, supra note 44, at 102-04. (judgeWright wrote the opinion for the court in this case.)
46. 350 F.2d at 449 (emphasis added). It is true that the court was applying commonlaw doctrine, since the UCC had not, at the time of the making of the contracts inquestion here, been enacted in the District of Columbia; but the court referred to theCode, and to Section 2-302, as "explicitly derived" from the "rationale of the cases" upon
which it relied. 850 F.2d at 449.
47. State by Lefkowitz v. ITM Inc., 52 Misc. 2d 39, 275 N.Y.S.2d 303 (1966).
48. This is a very abbreviated account of the case, the detailed facts of which take up
the greater part of a very lengthy opinion. A point which deserves mention here is thatpart of the promoters' grand design was the immediate assignment of the contracts to
finance institutions.
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ever, the court went on expressly to hold the installment contracts ob-
tained under the scheme "unconscionable" within the meaning of
Section 2-302. 49 For present purposes the important feature of the case
is that recruitments to the "referral plan" were apparently sought pre-
dominantly from low-income and low-literacy strata of society. This
factor, along with others, "placed the respondents in a position requir-
ing a much fairer and more honest course of dealing than would be
countenanced in the ordinary course of a commercial transaction. "60
In Frostifresh Corp. v. Reynoso,5 1 the buyers' native language was
Spanish, and although oral negotiations were conducted in that lan-
guage, the "form" contract eventually entered into was entirely in
English and was "neither translated nor explained"5 2 to the buyers.
The court, in holding that Section 2-302 barred the seller's action for
the price, emphasized that the buyers "were handicapped by a lack of
knowledge, both as to the commercial situation and the nature and
terms of the contract which was submitted in a language foreign to
them." 53 It would appear, therefore, that the "more honest course of
dealing" required in the context presently under discussion includes
translation (or, at the very least, "explanation") of the terms of the con-
tract where the consumer is known to have a defective knowledge of
English.5
4
The seller's knowledge of the buyer's impecuniousness was a factor
present, and noted by the court, in all three of the cases discussed
above. In Williams, the plaintiff company was aware that the buyer was
on welfare; the amount of her allowance and the name of her social
worker were listed on the reverse side of the contract. In the ITM
case, "in most cases it was immediately and outstandingly apparent
that these expensive products were far beyond the consumers' limited
means,"5 5 and the fact that immediate assignment was an integral part
49. 52 Misc. 2d at 53, 275 N.Y.S.2d at 321. Presumably so as to make quite sure that
the assignees could not recover.
50. 3 UCC REP. SERv. 793. The paragraph in which this passage appears is for un-
known reasons omitted from the reports of the case in 52 Misc. 2d and 275 N.Y.S.2d.
51. 52 Misc. 2d 26, 274 N.Y.S.2d 757 (1966), reVd with respect to damages, 54 Misc.
2d 119, 281 N.Y.S.2d 964 (1967).
52. 52 Misc. 2d at 27, 274 N.Y.S.2d at 758.
53. 52 Misc. 2d at 27, 274 N.Y.S.2d at 759.
54. In Hernandez v. SIC Finance Co., 5 UCC RE.P. SERV. 1151 (N.M. 1968), plaintiffs'
reliance on Section 2-302 failed when the court held the section inapplicable to the
secured transaction in issue. The court nevertheless referred to the plaintiffs' argument
that they "had no education in English . . . and had not had the agreement explained
to them in Spanish." It held that this contention was not established by the evidence,
thus recognizing, by implication, the relevance of the point in theory. 5 UCC Rs. SERv.
at 1154.
55. 3 UCC REP. SERv. at 793; see note 50 supra.
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of the selling scheme made this a matter of special culpability. In
Reynoso, too,
the defendant husband told the salesman that he had but one week
left on his job and he could not afford to buy the appliance. The
salesman distracted and deluded the defendants by advising them
that the appliance would cost them nothing because they would be
paid bonuses... on the numerous sales that would be made to
their neighbors and friends.56
The latter tactic is, of course, much the same as that used by the pro-
moters of the ITM affair.
It is only fair to point out that although in each of these cases the
court draws attention to the buyer's manifestly inadequate means,
nevertheless that factor is not made an independent reason for decision
in any of them. In view of the presence of various other factors touch-
ing on unconscionability such a course of action would perhaps have
been a needlessly bumptious one. And yet it is difficult to see why a
finding that the seller knowingly induced a buyer to enter into a con-
tract beyond his apparent means should not in itself be regarded as
potentially sufficient in point of unconscionability to justify judicial
intervention in one form or another, at least where the seller from the
beginning proposes to assign his rights, or to invoke repossession or
security rights and to profit by attendant fees.
Whatever the validity of this suggestion,57 it is fair to say that the
case of the underprivileged consumer has become recognized as sui
generis to a sufficient degree to warrant its institutionalization by way
of a quasi-presumptive pursuit of "unconscionability" whenever he
appears on the scene. 8 The implications of such an approach may, of
course, be far-reaching, especially where the ubiquitous installment
contract is concerned.5 9
Professor Leff is apparently not inclined to fall in with the strategies
here suggested: "the court," he writes, "ought not to be allowed to
56. 52 Misc. 2d at 27, 274 N.Y.S.2d at 758.
57. The Uniform Consumer Credit Code e.cplicidtly adopts this attitude: see § 6.111 (3)(a)
(Final Draft). The question is, of course, of much greater complexity than is suggested by
the scope and length of this discussion; a discriminating use of Section 2-302 may. however,
supply stop-gap answers to problems which clearly require a thorough and compre-
hensive investigation.
58. See also Central Budget Corp. v. Sanchez, 53 Misc. 2d 620, 279 N.Y..2d 391
(1967); Unico v. Owens, 50 NJ. 161, 232 A.2d 405 (1966); David v. Manufacturers Hanover
Trust Co., 4 UCC REP. Srv. 1145 (1968). The majority opinion in the Walker-Thomas
case, runs through these cases, by way of citation and quotation, like the proverbial
scarlet thread. See also Leff 555 n.288.
59. Cf. Danaher, J., dissenting, in Walker-Thomas, 350 F.2d at 450.
771
The Yale Law Journal
subsume its social decisions under a high-level abstraction like 'un-
conscionability.' "00
One may suggest that first (and less important) it tends to make
the true bases of decisions more hidden to those trying to use them
as the basis of future planning. But more important, it tends to
permit a court to be nondisclosive above the basis of its decision
even to itself; the class determination is so easy and so tempting
(and often so heart-warming) . . . . [N]o legislature in America
could be persuaded openly to pass such a statute, nor should any
be permitted to do so sneakily .... [I]f one wants to protect a class,
improvident by definition, from the depredations of another class,
it is at least arguable that one should just up and do so-but
clearly.6'
Professor Leff's argument that the "true bases of decision" remain
hidden, even to the courts themselves, appears to rest in the main on
his view that the recognition of "class" distinctions is a process which
"immensely simplifies decision by limiting the required inquiry to the
person's membership in the class," and that "Once that determination
is made, a certain legal result will flow." He cites, by way of illustra-
tion, the law relating to the capacity of minors to make contracts. But
nothing could be more misconceived than such an analogy. There is
no suggestion that the institutionalization of the "class" factor proceed
along the rigid and abstract lines of the majority-minority dichotomy;
it is, on the contrary, meant to be based firmly on very concrete and
particular references to lack of education, vulnerability of bargaining
position, and so forth. There is nothing to prevent the court from
taking account of idiosyncratic aspects of the situation before it. If the
consumer in question has particular knowledge or experience, and
therefore an adequate understanding of the language and situation
which confronts him, it is an elementary proposition that the court
may, indeed must, give this matter due consideration. 3
A word must also be said about Professor Leff's second point. That
no American legislature would "openly pass such a statute" is surely
a very curious argument indeed. If the precise results of legislation
60. Leff 557. At the time when Profesor Leff wrote, the only case available on the
point under discussion here was Walker-Thomas.
61. Id. 558.
62. Id. 556.
63. In State Bank of Albany v. Hickey, 29 App, Div. 2d 993, 288 N.Y.S.2d 980 (1968),
the majority held that the defendant, a car dealer who had made an assignment of a
conditional sales contract to the plaintiff bank, was bound by the guarantee contained
in the assignment contract, because he had read it, had been in the car business for
many years, had been a credit manager for a prominent lending Institution, and
had obligingly described himself as an "expert" on the witness stand.
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could always be foreseen, life might well be less of a burden to us all;
but the unavailability of such foresight has not prevented the vast
majority of American legislatures from enacting a provision so bla-
tantly open-ended as Section 2-302; and that is surely the point which
deserves emphasis if speculations about the gutsiness and/or wooden-
headedness of our legislatures are at all relevant to the subject.
B. Substantive Unconscionability
It seems clear that the major focus of Section 2-302 is in fact on issues
subsumable under the general heading of "substantive"" unconscion-
ability, Comment 1 goes to some lengths to establish a climate in which
courts will feel emboldened to strike directly at contracts or contrac-
tual terms which appear too heavily weighted in favor of one of the
parties; that is to act, in some measure at least, as a tribunal of consti-
tutional review applying "bill-of-rights" prescriptions to the parties'
private legislation.
Before turning to an investigation of the nature of substantive un-
conscionability itself (which, as will be seen, proceeds by way of dis-
tinguishing "overall imbalance" from "component unconscionabil-
ity"), a preliminary question must be considered: Is the power of "con-
stitutional" review referred to above absolute, in the sense that the
courts are entitled to find unconscionability even where the party
alleging it assented freely and fully to the terms of the bargain? Or is
it possible, by a sufficient specificity of bargaining, to "insulate" a
contract from judicial intervention under Section 2-302?75
1. The Question of Insulation
Suppose we take as an example a seller's disclaimer of warranties
which in the abstract is conceded, for the sake of the argument, to be
unconscionable. Can the seller, by explicitly drawing attention to the
clause, and by obtaining the buyer's clear and specific assent, prevent
the subsequent invocation of Section 2-302 by the reviewing tribunal?
64. This is Professor Left's term, which he uses to distinguish questions of unfair
"content" from those relating to bargaining misconduct ('procedural" unconscionability).
The terminology has its shortcomings, but I must confess to being unable to improve
upon it.
65. The question may also be asked in its reverse form: Is it possible to find a
contract, or a given term, unconscionable merely because the process of bargaining was
such as to make "free" assent impossible, even though the content arrived at Is, in Itself,
objectively conscionable? Analogous questions may be asked with respect to an), isolatable
component of unconscionability: Can a sufficient inequality of bargaining position bein itself decisive? Are certain terms unconscionable ipso facto, no matter what the con-
tractual context? and so forth. These matters are taken up below.
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(To make matters even more clear-cut, let parity of bargaining position
be presumed. 6 )
Professor Leff has shown, by a careful analysis of the drafting history
of Section 2-302, that the earliest predecessors of the present version
were specifically concerned with the question of insulation, that the
possibility of insulation was at first conceived of as virtually axiomatic,
but that the draftsmen eventually abandoned this view and opted, in
1948, for a doctrine of outright "per se unconscionability."6 7 This-in
Professor Leff's view-laudable clarity of position was, however, subse-
quently abandoned in favor of the obfuscation of the later drafts. Pro-
fessor Leff does not make it entirely clear whether he believes that the
final form of the section and comments renders the bargaining process
altogether irrelevant, or whether their obfuscating effect relates merely
to the "insulation" question. The former suggestion, although seem-
ingly entertained in passing,6 s is certainly untenable: the proposition
that in deciding whether a contract or one of its terms is unconscion-
able one may not inquire into the bargaining process is surely some-
what bizarre (and it will be seen that the courts which have so far
applied Section 2-302 have not thought themselves thus restricted). It
is, however, undeniable that the 1948 version clearly providedoo that
in some circumstances unconscionability might be found no matter
what the bargaining process had been, and that this version was re-
placed by words which are less unequivocal.
It may be true, as Professor Leff suggests, that this metamorphosis
is to be explained historically by the opposition of "important backers
of the Code" 70 to the explicitness of the 1948 version. Nonetheless the
change is both comprehensible and defensible in terms of policy. The
shibboleth "freedom of contract" may be pretty debased coinage now-
adays, bt-to mix metaphors-it surely still plays at least the role of
66. Professor Left does not seem to want to go as far as this: he consistently assumes
that the question here is simply whether inequality of bargaining position can In Itselfjustify intervention. Thus the 1948 version is said to mean: "The policy determination
was made, in effect, that one could use his superior bargaining power only so far."
Left 496. But there is no reason why the question of insulation should not be raised
in its purest form: suppose that there was no bargaining advantage, suppose the victim
merely made a mistake in "judgment" or didn't really exercise his mind on the point
in question. That is apparently how the draftsmen saw the issue: See Comment 4 of the
1948 version, quoted infra note 69.
67. Left 494-5.
68. One of a series of questions asked by Professor Left vis-,t-vis the amended comments
is: "Briefly put, is the manner in which a provision gets into a contract relevant or not?"
Left 497.
69. Comment 4 of the 1948 version refers explicitly to "cases where one party has
deliberately entered into a lop-sided bargain with full knowledge and awareness and has
actually assented to clauses which are unconscionable in effect against him."
70. See Left 501 n.50.
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a constitutional monarch. Occasions on which a bargain ought to be
struck down even though it was arrived at by full and free assent (giv-
ing these words a meaning as far as possible removed from the rhetori-
cal) must of necessity be rare, if they be conceded at all; and that such
a power be as explicitly conferred on the courts as it was by the 1948
version is arguably overbold. The important fact about the present
version of Section 2-302 is that there is nothing in it which denies such
a power to the court, should it be moved to exercise it by the extremity
of the situation before it. And that very extremity, which is a necessary
presupposition if we are to consider the possibility that a court may on
occasion be disposed to ignore free assent, is also the guarantee that the
equivocality of Section 2-302 on this point will be used positively and
not negatively-that is, the absence of interdiction will be taken to
imply authorization. By the same token, the level of extremity required
for judicial intervention under these circumstances is best left also to
be fixed (if it can be "fixed") under the stress of actual situation-work.
Here we have then an instance of draftsman's hiatus which implies,
I submit, a perfectly orderly sequence of analysis and a very deliberate
decision not to preclude, by premature dogmatism, further organic
development in the context of actual litigation. With respect to a
"residual category" embodied in a "standard," such a tactic is emi-
nently proper, and the vulnerability of Professor Leff's criticism here
is ultimately a reflection of his failure to bear in mind the distinction
between "standards" and the other legal prescriptions mentioned at
the beginning of this article. In the light of such a distinction it is
possible to recognize a high degree of calculation where Professor Leff
sees only "fudging. "7 1
2. "Overall Imbalance"72
Professor Leff rightly points out that the earliest versions of Section
2-302 "contemplated as the field of operation of Section 2-302 the entire
contract";73 that is to say, substantive unconscionability in fact meant
"something like 'gross overall imbalance' of an entire contract."74 In
this respect too, however, the 1948 version marks a moment of depar-
ture; this draft imported for the first time explicit mention of the con-
cept of "an unconscionable clause."
Professor Leff conceives of this moment as one of "progression...
71. "Thus faced with a dilemma . . . the draftsmen . . . fudged." Leff 501.
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from overall imbalance to one-clause naughtiness," and regards this
"progression" as "the most important single transformation disclosed
by a study of the drafting history."75 He writes:
[I]f one decides to police contracts on a clause-by-clause basis, he
finds that he has merely substituted the highly abstract word "un-
conscionable" for the possibility of more concrete and particular-
ized thinking .... Should warranty disclaimers be permitted?...
Should parties be allowed to agree about what law will govern
their contract? To what extent, if any, should a party be permitted
to limit his liability under a contract? All these questions need
decision. But not one of them is helped toward solution by being
subsumed in a section as a species of "unconscionability."70
It might first of all be observed that, while it may be true that "more
concrete and particularized thinking" is not made inevitable by the
subsumption referred to, the "possibility" of such thinking can hardly
be taken to have been removed, But more important, it is difficult to
understand why the addition of the single-clause provision must be
taken in any sense as a substitution of one kind (clause-by-clause) for
another kind (overall imbalance) of policing; surely the process should
be understood rather as one of supplementation of one method by
another.77 Section 2-302 continues to speak, after all, of unconscion-
ability of "the contract," apart from and beside its references to single
clauses. If one takes into account as well the express citation, in Com-
ment 1, of Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz78 (a classic case of overall im-
position), it becomes obvious that the concern with overall balance
manifested in the earliest drafts of the section cannot realistically be
assumed to have been abandoned altogether.
75. Id.
76. Id. 515-16 (emphasis added).
77. Even if "substitution" is, for the sake of argument, conceded, Professor Leff's
critique is founded on the notion that the difficulty inherent in deciding whether a single
clause is unconscionable is significantly greater than that involved in the weighing of
overall balance. It is not made entirely clear why one task should be so very much more
complicated than the other; in the end, the reason seems to be that If one asks the
overall-imbalance question it is at least easy to identify the "cake sliced 99-1," to
use Llewellyn's language. Leff 514 n.ll. But it is surely just as easy to identify the
extreme limits of unconscionability with reference to a single clause considered, as It must
always be, in the context of the whole bargain, even though when the metaphors of
"weight" and "balance" have been abandoned no handy quantitative formula suggests
itself. (A possible eample of such self-evident unconmcionability in the matter of single
terms is the kind of submission-to-a-foreign-forum clause used in the Paragon Homes
cases, there being no discernible reason for the inclusion of such a clause in the con-
tracts there involved except harassment. See pp. 803-05 infra.) And it may be asked,
in any case: what help is it to the court tQ be able to recognize the outer edges of
extremity when the great majority of the cases before it inevitably fall uncomfortably
close to the inner borderline?
78. 172 F.2d 80 (3d Cir. 1948).
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To assert that, as a matter of interpretive logic, the concept of "over-
all imbalance" has not been jettisoned is dearly not enough; it is nec-
essary also to supply an answer to the question: Precisely what function
is allotted to the concept as a criterion, or species, of unconscionability?
My attempt to provide this answer falls into two parts. First, I contend
that a court may refuse to enforce an agreement on the ground of
overall imbalance independent of any showing of component uncon-
scionability; second, I propose an additional or auxiliary role for the
concept: namely that of helping the court to decide whether it ought
simply to strike the contract down or "rewrite" it according to the dic-
tates of conscionability. To elaborate:
a. Overall Imbalance as a Form of Unconscionability
The crux of the issue here may be simply exposed by asking: May a
court apply Section 2-302 so as to characterize the whole of an agree-
ment as unconscionable even though no single component can be
found to deserve this epithet? The answer, it is submitted, is clearly
yes. That the draftsmen intended it so is evident from the citation of
the Wentz case. There the court, although it agreed with plaintiff's
argument that "the provisions of the contract are separable [sic],"s0 and
rejected defendant's contention that an individual clause was uncon-
scionable in itself,s ' nevertheless examined the contract as a whole and
found that "the sum total of its provisions drives too hard a bargain for
a court of conscience to assist."' a It is true that the action was one in
equity for specific performance, s3 but the draftsmen's incorporation of
the decision must be regarded as establishing that a court applying
Section 2-302 is to consider itself as much a "court of conscience" as
did the court in Wentz, and that the principle espoused there is to be
utilized mutatis mutandum when necessary.
It is also true that the peculiar aspect of the doctrine so imported is,
as Professor Leff notes, that "the one-sidedness complained of [is]
79. I use the word "component" rather than "clause" bemuse it seems self-evident
that references in Section 2-302 to "the unconsdonable dause" must be taken, in the
normal way, to embrace a plurality-either in the form of an aggregate of separates or
an interrelated complex-of such clauses. "Component," even "single component," is
meant to embrace all these variants.
80. 172 F.2d at 84.
81. Id. at 83.
82. Id. at 84.
83. Note that the supposition that a refusal to enforce the contract spedfically in
equity did not necessarily mean merely that the plaintiff was "left to his remedy at
law" does not, it has been argued, correspond with reality. See Frank & Endicott,
Defenses in Equity and "Legal Rights," 14 LA. L. REv. 380 (1954). But see Leff 541 n.237.
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irrelevant to the harshness complained of."84 What the defendants in
Wentz were suffering from was a fixed-price term in the context of an
enormously risen market, and there was no suggestion that the term
was in itself unfair. Unlike Professor Leff, I find this less than hair-
raising. There seems to be nothing inherently objectionable in a pro-
cedure whereby the courts may, in effect, make clear their view of the
proprieties of overall fairness of contractual content even though in
the particular case at bar that matter is not strictly "relevant" to the
calamity which has prompted one of the parties to invoke Section 2-302.
The moral of the Wentz case is simply that he who has exacted "too
hard a bargain" in the totality risks coming to grief in the courtroom
(should the matter get there) even though individual terms, considered
by themselves, do not transgress the bounds of conscionability. Put
this way it surely has something to recommend it.
Situations in which a vitiating degree of overall imbalance exists
even though no individual components of the contract can be un-
equivocally singled out as in themselves unconscionable are not, of
course, likely to arise very often. It is therefore not surprising that
cases utilizing Section 2-302 in the Wentz fashion have not so far
arisen (although there have been-as is argued below-certain de-
cisions from which one can at least derive a "picture" of sorts of
overall imbalance). The degree of emphasis placed on the overall
structure of the contract at issue in the Elkins-Dell85 and Dorset Steel
Equipment"8 decisions perhaps entitles one to consider them as giving
implicit support to the argument put forward above, although they
clearly involved identifiable component unconscionability as well,
especially with regard to price.8 7
b. Overall Imbalance and the Scope of Remedial
Action Under Section 2-302
It is clear that any given controversy is most likely to be centrally
concerned with only one, or a very few, of the total number of terms
embodied in the contract in question.8 Consequently the complaining
party very often objects justifiably to such a single term (or group of
terms), without necessarily asking at the same time that the whole con-
84. Id. 538.
85. In re Elkins-Dell Mfg. Co., 253 F. Supp. 864 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
86. In re Dorset Steel Equipment Co., 2 UCC REP. SEav. 1016 (E.D. Pa. 1965), con-
solidated on appeal with Elkins-Dell, supra notes 42 & 85.
87. See discussion at TAN 99-111 infra.
88. Cf. Left 515.
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tract be thrown out. The continuation of the contractual relationship,
modified in accordance with the dictates of conscionability, may be
of great importance to him: in fact, his position may well be that if he
were put to the choice between the continued operation of the contract
in its actual form, on the one hand, and its wholesale abandonment on
the other, he would opt for the former, unconscionability notwith-
standing. In these circumstances it would seem the merest common
sense to provide, as does Section 2-302, that the court, if it finds un-
conscionability, may
refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of
the contract without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit
the application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any un-
conscionable result.8 9
The court is thus no longer limited, as it seems on the whole to be
limited at law and in equity, to a simple choice between enforcement
or non-enforcement of the contract. It also has available to it a third
possible course of action: it may eliminate or "limit the application of"
the offending component so as to leave the parties with a "rewritten"
contract. It will be noted that Section 2-302(1) is in this respect per-
missive and not restrictive:90 that is to say, the court may decline to
enforce the contract as a whole even though only a single component
is found to be unconscionable in itself, although in such cases it is
surely reasonable to assume that elimination or limitation is prima fade
the more appropriate remedy. The question therefore arises: under
what circumstances should the court strike down the contract as a
whole rather than "rewrite" it? The following answer suggests itself:
either if it finds the contract as a whole (rather than any single com-
ponent) unconscionable, or if, even though a single component might
be characterized as unconscionable in itself, nevertheless the whole
contract is also so characterizable-that is to say, is afficted by "overall
imbalance." There is a dual reason for thus allotting to the concept of
overall imbalance the role of identifying those situations in which
a court may legitimately absolve the promisor from all contractual
obligation instead of exercising its option, under Section 2-302, to
redefine his obligations for him in accordance with the dictates of
89. UCC § 2-302(l).
90. I suppose it is possible, on the basis of syntax, to argue against this view, but
such an argument seems to me both excessively literal and against the general spirit of
Section 2-302 (which I take to be in favor of maximum flexibility of remedial action).
Cf. UCC § 1-106, which stipulates that the 'remedies provided by this Act shall be
liberally administered"; and, more particularly, UCC § 1-108 (presumption of severability).
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conscionability. First, the matter of convenience: the more contractual
provisions there are which give rise to offense, the more difficult the
task of judicial remolding. Second, the traditional and deeprooted,
if sometimes residual, respect for "freedom of contract"; the greater the
amount of rewriting needed, the more likelihood there is of a departure
from even the broadest "sense" of the transaction as originally con-
ceived by the parties themselves.
Nevertheless, a court should probably begin with a bias in favor of
"rewriting." Where modification of the contract, by way of appro-
priate treatment of the unconscionable component, seems to be capable
of working a measure of justice, it would seem unnecessarily and ar-
bitrarily zealous on the part of the court to go further. The court
should, in particular, be on guard against an inherited bias tending in
the opposite direction, that is, against modification of the contract:
Section 2-302 clearly calls for a break with tradition in this respect, and
it is more in accordance with its mood and tenor to err here on the side
of boldness than on that of caution.9'
It would seem, by and large, that only the wishes of the litigants
themselves should be allowed to override the basic predisposition which
I advocate. In this connection it is necessary to consider not only the
attitude of the promisor (i.e, the party invoking Section 2-302) but also
that of the promisee. Of course the promisee in the first place presum-
ably objects to all judicial intervention based on unconscionability;
given the fact of such intervention, however, he may well have a prefer-
ence as to the form it will take. A seller, for example, may well prefer
not having to deliver at all to having to deliver at a judicially deter-
mined "conscionable" profit. The relevant permutations of attitude
here seem to be as follows, a showing of unconscionability and the
consequent intervention of the tribunal being in each case presumed:
1. Both parties want "rewriting."
2. The promisor wants "rewriting" while the promisee prefers
wholesale dissolution.
3. Vice versa.
4. Both parties want dissolution.
From our present perspective case (1) seems to be the simplest of
all. Where the parties own wishes correspond with the fundamental
bias already referred to, it is difficult indeed to envisage circumstances
in which a court might justifiably strike down the contract as a whole.
91. Cf. UCC § 1-106.
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It is, however, possible to imagine three potential reasons for such
a course of action. First, and perhaps most plausibly, there is the
possibility that in a given situation the data on the basis of which any
"rewriting'" must proceed are unavailable or ambiguous. For instance,
it may be too difficult to arrive at a conscionable price, in place of the
unconscionable one set aside by the court, because of prevailing market
contingencies. 92 Second, the transaction in question may be one of a
continuing nature, so as to bring into play considerations akin to
those which prompt courts of equity to withhold specific performance
of contracts for "personal services" and the like. This factor increases
in importance, of course, the further one moves towards the view that
Section 2-302 ought to be regarded (as it certainly threatens to be
regarded 93) as part of the general jurisprudence of contracts, rather than
as narrowly applicable to sales. But even certain "transactions in
goods"94 may involve analogous elements. 3 Third (and this is more
tenuous), it is just possible that the court may, in cases of sufficient
"overall imbalance," decide that it knows better than the parties. The
contract may, for example, be so one-sided that the prospects of further
controversy seem certain to the court. When in addition one of the
parties persisting in what the court regards as a misjudgment as to the
viable nature of the contractual relationship happens to be disad-
vantaged in some way (e.g., to be a member of one of the "under-
privileged minorities" to which I have already devoted some atten-
tion),96 the court might perhaps be justified in giving effect to its own
view of the affair.
The further one moves away from a joint preference of the parties
for "rewriting," however, the more plausible becomes the prospect of
wholesale dissolution. The scale of plausibility ascends according to the
sequence of permutations set out above. Clearly the promisee's wishes
in this respect are less important than the promisor's, since by hypoth-
esis the former stands convicted on "unconscionability." But the bias
against dissolution which I have advocated works in favor even of the
culpable promisee. That is to say, even where the aggrieved promisor
92. The problems which might arise in this connection seemn to be somewhat akin
to those involved in the application of the principle that damages, in order to be recov-
erable, must be "certain."
93, See note 239 infra.
94. UCC § 2-102 provides that Article 2 "applies to transactions in goods" "[u]nless
the context otherwise requires."
95. E.g., American Home Improvement Inc. v. MacIver, 105 N.H. 435, 201 A.2d 826
(1964) (installation as well as supply of materials). But "transactions in goods" is a
problematical term. See pp. 808-11 infra.
96. See pp. 768-71 supra.
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requests dissolution the court ought, in the interests of tile principle
of security of transactions, 97 to go very carefully into the question
whether justice might not best be done by rewriting rather than dis-
solving the contract. Where both parties request dissolution, however,
somewhat the same considerations which were discussed a moment
ago with respect to the opposite situation (where both parties prefer
rewriting) apply in reverse.
In making its decision whether to strike down or to rewrite a con-
tract, however, the court has need of a framework of inquiry which
takes into account something more than the preferences of the parties.
It might first of all be suggested that the possibility of dissolution
depends to a large extent on the degree to which the contract remains
executory, or, to put the larger principle, on the ease with which the
pre-contractual status quo may be restored. Where the goods have been
delivered and have been consumed or used, the appropriateness of
dissolution is reduced accordingly. 98 Beyond such self-evident practical
considerations, however, it is at this point that the notion of "overall
imbalance" comes into its own. The principle suggested here is this:
the greater the degree of "overall imbalance," the more willing the
court should be to entertain the possibility of total dissolution, even
though the possibility of rewriting is also open. The bias, it must be
said once again, should be against dissolution, but in cases where that
bias begins to be eroded by the preferences of the parties (or even in
those very marginal situations in which, although the bias is reinforced
by the parties' preferences, the court feels obliged to disregard their
judgment), the test of "overall imbalance" assumes real relevance.
What then is overall imbalance? A "definition" which is not largely
tautologous seems hardly possible here; description by way of example
appears preferable. Unfortunately the yield of cases using Section
2-302 which can usefully be discussed in this context has so far been
small indeed. Two early and related decisions, In re Elkins-Dell Manu-
facturing Co.99 and In re Dorset Steel Equipment Co.,o although ana-
lyzable also-as was said earlier-in terms of component unconsion-
97. I realize that this principle can be invoked, in the context of a discussion of
Section 2-302, only with a certain irony. But it is arguably paying a residual deference
to it to take the view that it is preferable for the parties to be stuck with some pre-
cipitates of the transaction than to absolve them utterly.
98. See, e.g., Frostifresh Corp. v. Reynoso, 52 Misc. 2d 26, 274 N.Y.S.2d 757 (1966),
rev'd with respect to damages, 54 Misc. 2d 119, 281 N.Y.S.2d 964 (1967); Robinson v.
Jefferson Credit Corp., 4 UCC RaP. SERV. 15 (1967).
99. 253 F. Supp. 864 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
100. 2 UCC REP. SERV. 1016 (E.D. Pa. 1965), consolidated on appeal with El/tins-Dell,
supra note 99.
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ability, nevertheless present a good example of an agreement which,
at least on its face, displayed a clearly discernible overall tilt. Both
were cases of involuntary bankruptcy. In each case the bankrupt had
entered into an agreement with Fidelity America Financial Corpora-
tion under which Fidelity advanced money to the bankrupt against the
assignment of accounts receivable. In each case the question was
whether payments collected under these agreements after the filing of
the bankruptcy petitions should be turned over to the trustee on the
ground that the agreements were unconscionable. It is clear, of course,
that security agreements are not "transactions in goods" within the
meaning of Section 2-102, and the United States District Court, on
petitions for review, expressly declined to rule whether Section 2-302
might be extended to the present cases.10' It purported, however, to
apply those general principles of equity which are taken to be proto-
typical, so far as Section 2-302 is concerned, and in doing so made free
use of the word "unconscionable. °1 0 2
Under the two agreements in question, the bankrupts were pro-
hibited from assigning accounts or disposing of other assets to anyone
other than Fidelity; on the other hand Fidelity had no obligation to
buy any accounts-i.e., to finance the bankrupts. There were numer-
ous "additional and enslaving"'1 3 obligations. The bankrupt could not
borrow from anyone other than Fidelity without the latter's consent.
Fidelity had an almost unqualified right to change the terms of the
agreement unilaterally. 04 The bankrupt might not suspend business
without Fidelity's consent: Fidelity, in other words, "could force the
borrower to continue to buy goods and services on credit, knowing
that these would not be paid for and knowing that the benefits of such
non-payment would accrue to Fidelity," a circumstance which "not
only created a state of economic serfdom, but a way to cheat cred-
itors."'015 Moreover, Fidelity exacted a minimum charge of $6,000 per
annum, bearing "no relationship either to the actual flow of accounts
receivable between the parties or to any fixed obligation of Fidelity
to supply money. . . ."06 In sum:
101. 253 F. Supp. at 864.
102. Whether the cases ought nevertheless to be considered no more closely connected
with Section 2-302 than the general run of equity cases does not, in an) case, matter
according to the view which I take of the relevance of the latter. See pp. 785.86 infra.
103. 2 UCC REP. Smv. at 1024.
104. The bankrupt had a right of "dissent" within five days, but, as the referee noted,
the exercise of this right would presumably result in the cessation of financing.
105. 2 UCC REP. SEav. at 1025.
106. Id.
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The agreement gave all meaningful rights and remedies to Fi-
delity. The bankrupt's rights . . . are de minimis and trivial. The
agreement imposed onerous burdens and one-sided duties and
obligations on the bankrupt but committed Fidelity to no mutual
duties and obligations. 10 7
The referee accordingly held the agreements to be unconscionable and
unenforceable. 10 8 In reviewing his decision the District Court pointed
out that the case was not one where, owing to the deceptive bargaining
conduct or lack of understanding of one of the parties, assent might
be regarded as fictional, but rather one of "genuine assent by business-
men to terms which (it is asserted) ought not to be countenanced."'"0
[T]o prove unconscionability there must be a showing, not only
that the terms of the contracts are onerus [sic], oppressive, or one-
sided, but also that the terms bear no reasonable relation to the
business risks. This is a showing that depends on the commercial
environment and cannot be made from the face of a contract
alone." 0
The court then remanded the cases for "prompt and thorough factual
hearings" to ascertain "whether these contracts were, in the light of all
the circumstances, reasonable commercial devices.""'
That overall balance is not profitably discussed in vacuo is, of course,
a point well taken, particularly with reference to an agreement which,
on its face, could scarcely be more one-sided. Although the court
asserted that it was applying general principles of equity, it is difficult
to resist the conclusion that Section 2-302(2)-the hearing provision-
was overwhelmingly influential here. The court in Campbell Soup Co.
v. Wentz," 2 working in what must realistically be conceived of as a pre.
Code era despite the existence of early drafts, and applying a presum-
ably pristine view of equity law, showed no disinclination to work on
107. Id. at 1025.
108. It is true that he nevertheless awarded the lender the "legal" rate of interest. But
this is hardly to be seen as an instance of "rewriting" the contract; rather it must be
regarded as being in the nature of restitutional compensation for an executed con-
sideration.
109. 253 F. Supp. at 871. In view of the court's awareness of the "economic duress"
aspects of the situation, its use of the phrase "genuine assent" seems somewhat para-
doxical.
110. Id. at 873.
111. Id. at 874. The Court elaborated to some degree on the issues to be cxplorcd
at the hearings. See TAN 267 infra. A very obvious, and at least potentially sufficient,
explanation for the onerous nature of the contracts In these cases is the fact that the
bankrupts were hardly, at the time of the agreements, sound financial risks. Cf. Con-
sumers Time Credit Inc. v. Remark Corp., 259 F. Supp. 185, 187 (ED. Pa. 1966).
112. 172 F.2d 80 (3d Cir. 1948).
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the basis of the face of the contract there involved. 1 3 The Code's hear-
ing provision, on the other hand, explicitly preserves reference to the
contractual context. And to give the parties, in cases of claimed or ap-
parent unconscionability, an opportunity to "present evidence as to
• . .commercial setting, purpose and effect"" 4 of the contract is to
concede that the issue of "overall balance," or any other aspect of
unconscionability, cannot easily be resolved in the abstract,"1 and to
warn that generalizations in terms of the "content" of contracts as
such were not intended by the draftsmen.
Only two other cases using Section 2-302 may usefully be referred
to here; in neither was the hearing provision invoked. In the ITM
case" 6 the court declared the installment contracts in question wholly
unenforceable; although overt fraud was probably an important factor
in the decision, the case certainly presents a striking picture of overall
imbalance. American Home Improvement, Inc. v. Maclver,"T on the
other hand, is from the present point of view a troublesome decision.
The court there concerned itself exclusively with matters of price:
nowhere is there any suggestion that the contract was one-sided in
other respects. The court's decision to strike down the whole contract,
rather than merely to award a "reasonable profit,""18 is perhaps most
politely explained in terms of the peculiarity of the transaction before
it. The plaintiff had agreed not only to supply the materials but to
install them as well, and to have told him to do that work for a
"reasonable" profit would no doubt have been inviting the sort of
trouble which equity courts avoid by refusing specific relief in cases
involving personal service contracts."19
The scantiness of authority utilizing Section 2-302 in this area is
not a matter for undue concern, since there is a substantial body of
equity case-law available to be drawn upon. "That equity does not
113. Whether a similar cavalierness applies in the case of the common law uncon-
sdonability doctrine (if there is one: see note 123 in! ra) is not dear. Cf. Williams v.
Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965), where the court remanded
the case for trial on the issue of unconscionability (conceived of in "procedural" terms,
however).
114. UCC § 2-302(2).
115. Cf. EXF. Lynch, Inc. v. Picdrilli, 28 Mass. App. Dec. 49, 5 UCC REP. Sav. 830(1964).
116. 52 Misc. 2d 39, 275 N.YS.2d 803 (1966).
117. 105 N.H. 435, 201 A.2d 886 (1964).
118. As was done, for instance, in Frostifresh Corp. v. Reymoso, 52 Misc. 2d 26, 274
N.Y.S.2d 757 (1966), rev'd with tespect to damages, 54 Misc. 2d 119, 281 N.Y.S.2d 964(1967). See TAN 140-144 infra.
119. Reference may also be made to the fact that the court in Madver was playing,
with respect to Section 2-302, a pioneering role, and that it had the aid of counsel on
one side only. Plaintiff, as noted by Professor Leff, presented no appellate brief. See
105 N.H. at 437, 201 A.2d at 887.
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enforce unconscionable bargains is too well established to require
elaborate citation," said the court in Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz,120
citing Pomeroy 21 and Williston, 122 and the explicit reference to this
case in Comment 1 of Section 2-302 must be taken to draw equity
doctrine into the ambit of statutory unconscionability. A close scrutiny
of the equity cases is beyond the scope of this article. If the com-
mentators123 may be believed, however, and if Campbell Soup may be
taken to be representative, then "overall imbalance" is certainly a
recognized species (perhaps the major species) of unconscionability
in the equity context. 24
3. Component Unconscionability
In some ways, the assessment of single contractual components in
terms of unconscionability, although a major (if one is to go by the
Comment cases, the major) concern of Section 2-302, presents the
most difficult problem of all. This is so not only because the relation-
ship of single clause to contractual and situational context is a matter
of such variability and intangibility as to make the process of generaliza-
tion a daunting one. But also, and above all, because with respect to
120. 172 F.2d at 83.
121. 4 J. POMEROY, EQurrY JURISPRUDENCE § 1405a (5th ed. 1941).
122. 5 S. WtLLISON, CONTRACTS § 1425 (rev. ed. 1937).
123. See, e.g., 3 J. PoMERoY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 926-28 (5th ed. 1941). Professor
Left goes so far as to suggest that, in point of "substantive" unconscionability, all
equity cases "really depend upon a finding of inadequate overall consideration." (Pro-
fessor Left therefore considers equity principles to be irrelevant in the present context,
since he disputes the relevance of "overall imbalance" altogether, as we have seen). Sec
Left 538.
The common law is said to have had no unconscionability doctrine as such. See, e.g.,
I A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 128, at 551 (1963). Direct invocations of "unconsctonability" by
way of dictum have not, however, been entirely lacking. See, e.g., Mr. Justice Frankfurter's
famous dissent in United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corporation, 315 U.S. 289, 326
(1942), and cases noted in Annot., 18 A.L.R.3d 1305, 1310-12. And Williams v. Walker.
Thomas Furniture Co. must presumably be regarded as innovative in this area. See, also
Unico v. Owen, 50 N.J. 101, 232 A.2d 405 (1967). That mistake, duress and fraud-
especially the extraordinary doctrine of "constructive fraud"--served, in any case, as
functional equivalents of "unconscionability" on many occasions is hardly open to debate.
These "law" cases do not, however, move in terms of "overall imbalance," but concern
themselves with specific contractual terms. See also Comment, Unconscionable Contracts:
The Uniform Commercial Code, 45 IowA L. REv. 843, 850-54 (1960); Davenport, supra
note 8.
124. It is also noteworthy that the court in Wentz drew particular attention to
paragraph 9 of the agreement, under which Campbell Soup was "excused from accepting
carrots under certain circumstances. But even under such circumstances the grower is
not permitted to sell them elsewhere unless Campbell agrees. This is the kind of pro-
vision which the late Francis H. Bohlen would call 'carrying a good joke too far." 172
F.2d at 83. Clauses of this kind, as well as analogous terms, have often been considered
by courts of law in connection with the so-called doctrine of mutuality. It may be that
decisions which have declared contracts unenforceable on the ground of "lack of
mutuality" are often to be explained by a covert recognition of unconscionable features
of the transaction before the court; if so, there is here a further body of case-law worth
investigating for those who would be made happy by such a task.
786
Vol. 78: 757, 1969
In Defense of Unconscionability
each "kind" of clause the question of per se unconscionability heaves
itself into view in clear and inescapable outline. It is no longer possible
to produce, as I did with respect to questions of bargaining conduct, a
formula in terms of "sufficient degree."' There are (at least for
present purposes) no "degrees" to a clause waiving trial by jury: either
it does or it doesn't. Nor is the minimal comfort of a general negative
proposition'2 6 available here: it obviously cannot be asserted that such-
and-such a clause can never, no matter what the context, be found to
be unconscionable.
The converse proposition, however-an assertion that all clauses of
type X, wherever found, are always unconscionable-is at least poten-
tially feasible (just as the Code might, as Professor Left notes,1-7 have
simply declared all warranty disclaimers illegal). But to deal in such
generalities is to pitch the level of inquiry at too uncomfortable an
altitude. It is more useful, if less satisfying, to preserve in all cases
some degree of contextual reference, such as the Code provides by
way of the hearing provision of Section 2-302(2).
This does not, however, dispose of inquiry in terms of per se un-
conscionability at the more modest level kept to throughout this paper.
In the present context that inquiry may be put in this form: May (not
must) clause X be found unconscionable per se, without reference to
the other component factors of unconscionability such as bargaining
procedure and position and overall imbalance? Examination of the
various individual clauses discussed below proceeds in these terms.Y2
a. Excessive Price
The law, we are told, will not inquire into the adequacy of con-
sideration; the promisee does not forfeit his right to the promisor's
performance because he has paid too small a price. Which is, of course,
125. It will be remembered that I argued, with respect to such conduct, that "a
sufficiency of deception may in itself, without more, be enough to absolve the promisor
from all (or any particular) obligation." See p. 763 supra.
126. Such as I put forward with respect to "bargaining position." See pp. 766-67
Sup Ta.
127. Leff 516.
128. I have examined only those clauses which have so far received attention by
courts applying or invoking Section 2-302. Obviously this list is not intended to be
exhaustive for the future, or even the present: the Code itself, it will be remembered,
provides, for instance, that liquidated damages provisions are subject to the test of rca-
sonableness. UCC § 2-718, Comment I. Cf. Denkin v. Sterner, I0 Pa. D. & C2d 203, 70
York Leg. Rec. 105 (1956); Henry v. W.S. Reichenbach & Son, Inc., 45 Pa. D. & C.2d 171.
172, 5 UCC REP. S.Rv. 985, 986 (1968).
I make no apology for fragmenting inquiry by factual categorization of the kind
adopted below. The task of pinning down the "meaning" of unconscionabiity must
necessarily (and should ideally) proceed by way of recognition and classification of "type"
situations. Cf. L Iw. YN, THE Bwd.muz Busr 159 (1965).
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merely another way of saying that the promisor may not go back on his
undertaking merely because its value is grossly in excess of the counter-
performance rendered or promised by the other party.120
It is nonetheless true that the law has not wholly refused to pay heed
to inequalities of exchange. As long ago as 1909 Roscoe Pound wrote:
"From the time that promises not under seal have been enforced at all,
equity has interfered with contracts in the interests of weak, necessi-
tous, or unfortunate promisors."'130 In 1947, Professor Dawson con-
cluded that the prevention of unjust enrichment was "the main func-
tion of duress doctrines":' 13 and the 1964 edition of Fuller and
Braucher's Basic Contract Law lists "at least" nine established "excep-
tions" to the general principle, noting that others (including uncon-
scionability under the Code) may be in the process of development. 12
Altogether there has been no dearth of comment on the discovery and
demonstration of judicial' 33 price justice, and it would be surprising if
it were otherwise.' 3'
The Code, it will be noticed, makes no attempt to supply a mathe-
matical formula, and preserves, via Section 2-302(2), the possibility of
justifying (at least theoretically) any price by reference to "commercial
setting, purpose and effect."'313 But the idea of price as an independently
operative factor in matters of unconscionability seems to have been
adopted enthusiastically by the courts. No other single factor has so
far received as much attention.
The earliest case on point, American Home Improvement, Inc. v.
Maclver,136 is perhaps still the most unequivocal. Plaintiff sued for
damages, alleging breach of a contract under which defendant had
agreed to pay a total of $2,568.60 for various improvements to his home
129. Documentation would be redundant. The pleasure of citing Thomag Hobbes
has in this country been thoroughly spoilt by the compilers of case-books, who seem to
regard the flinging of the Leviathan into the fray as an obligatory piece of virtuosity. See,
e.g., L. FuLLER & R. BRAUCHER, BASIC CONTkAUr LAW 177 (1964); F. KESSLEr, 9 M. SHARP,
CONTRACrs 249 (1953).
130. Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE L.J. 454, 482 (1909). Cf. Matks v. Gates, 154
F. 481 (D. Alas. 1907), and citatiois therein.
131. Dawson, Economic Duress: An Essay in Perspective, 45 Mxcn. L. REv. 258, 282
(1947).
132. L. FULLER & R. BRAUCHER, BASIC CoNTRAcr LAW, 180-81 (1964). And this list
omits the "functional equivalents." See note 123 supra.
138. I leave out of account, for obvioUg reatons, the vast amount of relevant legisla.
tion, e.g., usury laws.
134. Nevertheless Professor Left thinks it questionable "whether the legislatures
which have flocked to embrace the Code would have been willing to adopt a provision
which frankly and openly declared that overcharges of large but unspecified degree
could be invalidated by courts oil an ad hoc basis, at least as part of a conimtercial code."
Left 549 (emphasis in original). See pp. 172-73 supta for my observations In rebuttal.
135. UCC § 2-302(2).
136. 105 N.H. 435, 201 A.2d 886 (1964).
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to be supplied and installed by the plaintiff. The total sum referred
to included a "cash price" of $1,759.00, the rest representing various
charges under a long-term financing agreement arranged for by the
plaintiff. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire held that the re-
quirements of a lending statute requiring full disclosure in lending
transactions 37 had not been complied with, and that recovery might
be denied on that ground. It went on, however, to hold that the
transaction was unenforceable on "another and independent ground"
-that of unconscionability under Section 2-302.
Inasmuch as the defendants have received little or nothing of
value and under the transaction they entered into they were pay-
ing $1,609 for goods and services valued at far less, the contract
should not be enforced because of its unconscionable features. 135
Since the court makes no reference to elements of bargaining procedure
or position, or to other factors, MacIver must be taken as strong au-
thority for a per se unconscionability principle as delineated in our
earlier discussion. 39
Support for such a principle may be drawn from subsequent cases.
Although matters of bargaining conduct and position played some part
in Reynoso, 40 the court formulated the issue in terms of price:
The question presented in this case is simply this: Does the
court have the power under Section 2-302 of the Uniform Code to
refuse to enforce the price and credit provisions of the contract in
order to prevent an unconscionable result.'
The court went on to hold that the contract, under which an appli-
ance which had cost the seller $348 was being passed on to the pur-
chaser for a total (including "credit charges") of $1,145.88, was (quot-
ing the Wentz decision, itself seen as concerned with "oppression with
respect to price"'1 ) "too hard a bargain"'4 3 and unenforceable. The
137. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 399-B:2 (Supp. 1965).
188. 105 N.H. at 439, 201 A.2d at 889.
189. Accord, Annot., IS A.L.R.d 1305, 1308 (1968); see pp. 787-88 supra. The argument
has been made that the word "features," in the passage extracted above, indicates a
plurality of factors contributing to the finding of unconscionability. See Shulkin, Un-
conscionabilit)-The Code, the Court, and the Consumer, 9 B.C. IND. & Comr. L. REV.
367, 370 (1968). This strikes me as excessively literalistic. Besides, the only other "feature"
of relevance in the case appears to be the fact of non-disclosure of interest rate, which
the court mentions only in connection with the statutory provision already referred to.
Non-disclosure is, of course, easily conceived of as a matter of bargaining unconscionabil-
ity, but the court did not refer to it when discussing Section 2--02.
140. 52 Misc. 2d 26, 274 N.Y.S.2d 757 (1966), rev'd with respect to damages, 54 Misc.
2d 119, 281 N.Y.S.2d 964 (1967).
141. 52 Misc. 2d at 27, 274 N.Y.S.2d at 759.
142. 52 Misc. 2d at 28, 274 N.Y.S.2d at 759.
143. Id.
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New York Supreme Court upheld the finding of unconscionability
as clearly warranted by the evidence, although it reversed on the
question of damages. 144
In the ITM case, 145 where prices charged for household appliances
varied from two to six times the cost of the units to the respondents
and were usually more than twice the retail market value, the same
court suggested that such prices were "unconscionable per se." 140 And
a plain statement that "[E]xcessively high prices may constitute con-
tractual provisions within the meaning of Section 2-302" issued from
the court in Central Budget Corp. v. Sanchez.' 47 This dictum was
quoted with approval in Toker v. Perl,4 8 a New Jersey case involving
an installment sales contract for a refrigerator-freezer, the price of
which, according to expert testimony accepted by the court, "was in
excess of two and one half times the maximum value.' u 40 The issue
before the court was again somewhat muddied by allegations of fraud,
but the court, in holding the contract to be unenforceable, relied in
the alternative on square invocation of Section 2-302.
It is submitted that these authorities make clear that a sufficient dis-
parity between "value" and price may, by itself, be a species of uncon-
scionability. 1' 0 There is certainly no particular cause for alarm at
such a conclusion. The civil law has worked happily with the notion
of laesio enormis for a long time.1 ' That the precise degree of dis-
parity required for a finding of unconscionability has not been defined
is a matter for rejoicing rather than for sorrow. 5 2
144. 54 Misc. 2d 119, 281 N.Y.S.2d 964 (1967). See p. 791 infra.
145. 52 Misc. 2d 39, 275 N.Y.S.2d 303 (1966).
* 146. 52 Misc. 2d at 53, 275 N.Y.S.2d at 321.
147. 53 Misc. 2d 620, 621, 279 N.Y.S.2d 391, 392 (1967). See also Romine Inc. v.
Savannah Steel Co., 117 Ga. App. 353 (1968).
148. 103 N.J. Super. 500, 247 A.2d 701, 5 UCC REP. SERV. 1171 (1968). The court also
cited Reynoso.
149. 5 UCC REP. SERv. at 1174.
150. But see Shanker & Abel, Consumer Protection Under Article 2 of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 29 OHio ST. L.J. 689, 706 (1968). I do not mean to suggest, of course,
that an "excessive" price is necessarily unconscionable. If the parties have by honest-
to-God dickering arrived at an objectively excessive price, the court need not feel com-
pelled to intervene. Cf. Vitex Manufacturing Corp. Ltd. v. Caribtex Corp., 377 F.2d
795 (1967). "But in determining what they have agreed upon good faith is a factor and
consideration should be given to the fact that the probability is small that a real price Is
intended to be exchanged for a pseudo-obligation." UCC § 2-313, comment 4.
151. The restricted scope of the doctrine of laesio enormis does not seem to detract
from the point. For those who feel the need for guidance from the past sufficiently
strongly, it might be comforting to look not only into the question of lesion, but into
the civil law treatment of "unconscionability" generally. See, e.g., Cellini & Wertz, Un-
conscionable Contract Provisions, A History of Unenforceability from Roman Law to the
UCC, 42 TUL. L. REV. 193 (1967).
152. It is interesting to note that the Uniform Consumer Credit Code does not attempt
to go beyond "gross disparity" either. See UCC § 6.111(3)(c). Shanker & Abel, supra note
150, suggest, incidentally, that "most American cases seem to require at least" a price-
790
Vol. 78: 757, 1969
In Defense of Unconscionability
The Maclver case raises, as indicated earlier, a serious question as
to whether dissolution is in these cases an appropriate remedy. Except
in those rare circumstances in which the factor of "overall imbalance"
assumes an overriding importance,sa5 it would seem that the more
rational solution is to "rewrite" the price term. In cases involving
excessive interest charges, reference might be had to the "lawful rate."' "
Where there is simply an inflation of the cash price, the court might
allow the seller a "reasonable profit," as was done in Reynoso. There
the trial court awarded the seller his cost price, plus interest, refusing
explicitly to reimburse him for salesmen's commissions, legal fees, or
any other items of overhead. On this point the New York Supreme
Court reversed, being "of the opinion that plaintiff should recover
its net cost for the refrigerator-freezer, plus a reasonable profit, in addi-
tion to trucking and service charges necessarily incurred and reason-
able finance charges,"'5x 5 and ordered a new trial on the issue of dam-
ages.' 56
Professor Leff's view of the problem under discussion is worthy of
comment here. Although he is not, it would seem, unalterably op-
posed to the notion of excessive price itself, Professor Leff finds it
questionable whether that notion ought to be introduced by way of
subsumption "under a high level abstraction like 'unconscionabil-
ity,' '157 and proceeds to argue that the "decision in the Maciver case
exposes the weaknesses of abstraction so deliciously that it justifies
esurient consideration."'5 8 "Esurience" is duly given free rein, result-
ing in a concedely telling exposure of the "breathtaking economics"'
' 5
of the Maciver decision. There is no need to go into the mathematics
value differential of one-half as a measure of unconscionability": 29 Onto Sr. LJ. at
706. The exhilarating sanguineness of this statement ("most American cases"-how many
are there?) is matched only by its splendid vagueness ('seem to require," "at least,"
"price-value differential," "as a measure').
153. See pp. 777-86 supra.
154. See, e.g., In re Elkins-Dell Mffg. Co., 253 F. Supp. V4 (E.D. Pa. 1966). In Penn-
sylvania the defense of usury is not available to a corporation. Id. at 866. For a fuller
discussion of this case see pp. 782-84 supra.
155. 54 Misc. 2d at 120, 281 N.Y.S.2d at 965. Cf. Hume v. United States, 132 U.S. 406(1889) (action for price; recovery limited to market value where derical mistake made
by buyer).
156. The issue did not arise in Toker, apparently because the contract there was still
wholly executory. I do not mean to suggest, incidentally, that there may not be occasions
on which a court might legitimately limit the seller's recovery to his cost price as a
"punitive" measure. Presumably the trial court's zeal in Reynoso was motivated by the
tatc fthe plaintiff's salesman, which savored of fraud; the court's reference to the
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here: suffice it to say that in assessing the "true value" of goods and
services to be supplied under the contract the court excluded alto-
gether the sizable-$800 -- commission paid by the plaintiff to his
salesmen, and, in further excluding "interest and carrying charges,"
made "absolutely no attempt to work out what the true effective
yearly rate of interest is for [the] five-year payout."' 0
Now it might seem at first sight that this recital of the court's
peccadilos in matters of accounting, though interesting in itself, has
little bearing on the wider issue of price justice under Section 2-302;
not so, however, according to Professor Leff; for the responsibility for
judicial error is not, in this instance, to be attributed to the much-
invoked fallibility of mankind but rather to the section itself:
[T]he court in this case went on nothing but guesswork to reach
its decision, examined none of the relevant considerations and was
encouraged by 2-302 to behave in just that way. Had the section
been in less abstract terms, perhaps an examination of the relevant
factors would have taken place. . ... When the key evaluative
word, however, is a description of the judge's own state of mind
rather than of the situation which might be justified in producing
such a state, the likelihood that the court will even examine the
relevant questions is severely lessened.' 0'
Professor Leff's suggestion is that a provision which infuses into the
law of sales the after all revolutionary notion of an overall require-
ment of conscionability, and explicitly provides for a hearing of evi-
dence on the issue,162 actually encourages the courts to perpetrate
laxities and superficialities of potentially horrendous proportions.
Professor Leff may, of course, have known more capricious courts
than I. My impression of (at least appellate) courts is, on the whole,
that the more expansive standard applied, the sourer the mien, the
greater the particularism, and the more pronounced the anxiety to
confine the decision "to the facts." That the New Hampshire Court
was, in those salad days, taken in by defendant's counsel (in the
absence of an appellate brief from the plaintiff) hardly amounts to a
conclusive demonstration of the contrary.1 03
160. Id.
161. Left 550-51 (emphasis in original). I pass with some regret over the suggestion,delicious in its implications, that it was actually the judge's own state of mind which
was "unconscionable" in the Maclver case.
162. Professor Left, it should be noted, thinks very little of the hearing provision.
See pp. 812-14 infra.
163. It should be noted, moreover, that the computations to which Professor Left
takes justifiable exception were not directly related by the Court to the question of
"unconscionability" under Section 2-302, but were used instead to bolster the argument
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Lower courts have, it is true, generally proved so far only some-
what more sophisticated than the MacIver court in this respect. Talk
of the "true value" of the subject-matter of the transaction has, how-
ever, been replaced with less metaphysical references to seller's cost
or other tangible standards.104 In Reynoso, as we have seen, the point
of departure was the $348 which the seller conceded to be what he had
paid for the refrigerator-freezer in question. In ITAI, price-talk was
in term5 of "the cost of the units to the respondents" and "retail
value."'16 5 In neither case, however, was there any real attempt to
work out the interest rate along the lines suggested by Professor Left
with respect to Maclver. 0  This matter still awaits authoritative
treatment by a major appellate tribunal.
A greater readiness to invoke the hearing provision of Section
2-302(2) may to some extent take care of the problem. A hearing will
of itself surely generate concern with the facts and mathematics of the
situation before the court. It is to be noted that the court in Reynoso
held such a hearing before it came to a decision; 0 7 in Sanchezl
0s
the court denied plaintiff's motion for summary judgment in order,
i7iter alia, to allow for a hearing on the question of unconscionability.
b. Warranty Disclaimers and Remedy Limitations
0 0
Neither warranty disclaimers nor remedy limitations are, of course,
unconscionable in themselves under the Code: Sections 2-316 and
2-719 respectively legitimize both explicitly. Professor Leff's attitude
that the "purpose" of the New Hampshire lending statute, on which the Court relied
in the first part of its opinion, might in the circumstances disclosed by such arithmetic
best be implemented by denying recovery to the plaintiff- the statute itself forbids the
extension of credit without requisite disclosure without making explicit the precise
way in which problems arising out of an accomplished contravention of this prohibition
should be resolved. As to Section 2-302, the passage quoted in the text at note 162 em-
bodies, it will be noted, a distinctly non-arithmetical reference to goods and services
"valued at far less" than the total amount payable.
164. In Toker v. Perl, 103 N.J. Super. 500, 247 A.2d 701, 5 UCC REP. SERv. 1171
(1968), the defendant buyers produced an "expert witness" who testified in terms of
"maximum value." See 103 NJ. Super. at 503, 247 A -d at 702, 5 UCC REP. SEav. at
1172. One is hardly entitled to object to the court's acceptance of this seemingly im-
precise terminology, since the seller did not, apparently, offer any evidence in rebuttal.
165. 52 Misc. 2d at 53, 275 N.Y.S.2d at 320-21.
166. Cf. Elkins-Dell, 253 F. Supp. 864 (E.D. Pa. 1966); In the matter of Advance
Printing & Litho. Co., 277 F. Supp. 101 (W,D. Pa, 1967); aft'd. 387 F.2d 953 (3d Cir. 1967);
Whitestone Credit Corp, v, Barbory Realty Corp., l UCC REP. Srsv. 176 (164)-all
non-sales cases.
167. 52 Misc. 2d at 27, 274 N.Y.S.24 at 79. I have been unable to obtain a transcript
of this hearing.
168. 53 Misc. 2d 620, 279 N.LS.2d 391 (1967). But see note 265 infra.
169. I discuss these two "components" together not only because they are analogous
in function and effect, both being "exculpatory" clauses (or what in Anglo-Saxon circles
have been called "exception clauses"), but also because, as a result of this similarity.
unconsdionability works in the same way with respect to both.
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is that, in view of the presence of these sections, the relevance of
Section 2-302 to contractual terms of this nature is highly question-
able. With respect to remedy limitations, the comments to Section
2-719 specify that the exclusion of remedies is-except as to "conse-
quential damages"' 70 -not permissible; that any limitation must be
"reasonable" and not "unconscionable"; that there must be "at least
minimum adequate remedies" and/or71 "a fair quantum of remedy."
Professor Leff argues that in view of these very explicit requirements
Section 2-302 is, in this connection, substantially redundant: "As
benchmarks for determining the permissibility of a remedy limita-
tion, 2-302's 'oppression and unfair surprise' can't hold a candle to
2-719's 'fail of its essential purpose,' 'minimum adequate remedy,'
and 'fair quantum of remedy.' "172
With respect to warranty disclaimers, Professor Leff's attitude is
naturally even less equivocal. Section 2-316 provides for the disclaim-
ability of warranties, makes-unlike Section 2-719-no reference to
"unconscionability", and moreover provides-again unlike Section
2-719--detailed "procedural" standards whereby compliance with the
norms of bargaining conscionability may be judged. It is, therefore,
impossible to argue here, as one might perhaps argue with respect to
remedy limitations, that there is scope for resort to Section 2-302 at
least with respect to bargaining conduct. Professor Leff writes:
It appears to be a matter of common assumption that section
2-302 is applicable to warranty disclaimers. I find this, frankly,
incredible. Here is 2-316 which sets forth clear, specific and
anything but easy-to-meet standards for disclaiming warranties.
It is a highly detailed section . . . . It contains no reference of
any kind to section 2-302, although nine other sections of Article 2
contain such references. In such circumstances the usually bland
assumptions that a disclaimer which meets the requirements of
170. Although both limitation and exclusion of consequential damages are permisslble
under Section 2-719(3), and limitation or exclusion must not be "unconscionable," the
section goes on to provide that "Limitation of consequential damages for injury to the
the person in the case of consumer goods is prima facie unconscionable but limitation
of damages where the loss is commercial is not."
Despite this explicitness, old and undesirable habits do not die easily. In Henry v.
W.S. Reichenbach & Son, Inc., 45 Pa. D. & C.2d 171, 5 UCC Rm'. SERV. 985 (1968), a case
not, it should be noted, dealing with consumer goods, the court declared a clause ex-
cluding liability "for any damage for injury to any person or property on or off the
premises, resulting from the work by Contractor from any cause whatsoever,"[] Inap-
plicable to the facts before it, and chose to do so by means of interpretation contra
proferentum, thus inviting the draftsman back to the attack in time-honored fashion.
171. One might be excused for thinking that "minimum adequacy" and "fair quan-
tum" are two different things, but Comment 1 seems to treat these phrases as synonymous
or at least cumulative in effect.
172. Leff 519.
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2-316 might still be strikable as "unconscionable" under 2-302
seems explainable, if at all, an oversight, wishful thinking or (in
a rare case) attempted sneakiness.7 3
And yet, and yet .... The ten cases cited in Comment 1 of Sec-
tion 2-302 as illustrative of the "underlying basis" of that section are
all concerned, as Professor Leff himself points out, with remedy limita-
tions or warranty disclaimers. "Oversight" seems hardly possible in such
circumstances; and if a recognition of this aspect of the Section is
"attempted sneakiness," then may heaven preserve us from artless-
ness. The lesson of these cases (and it is fully in accord with the
general tenor of Section 2-302 as an ultimate bill-of-rights provi-
sion in the field of sales) must surely be that a remedy limitation
may be such as to leave a "fair quantum" of remedy under Section
2-719 and nevertheless be unconscionable under Section 2-302;174 and,
similarly, that a warranty disclaimer may be procedurally unimpeach-
able under Section 2-316 and nevertheless be unconscionable under
Section 2-302.'17
Ah, but how? One might, of course, take refuge here in the general
proposition, put at the outset of this essay, that unconscionability is
a "standard" which awaits, and is designed to encourage, organic
development by the courts; that, if we assume the eventual existence
of a meaningful quantum of such situation-work, the relevance of Sec-
tion 2-302 in the present context is properly that of a referent mak-
ing available to the tribunal faced with a remedy limitation or war-
ranty disclaimer the sum total of experience gathered by way of judi-
cial exposition of that section. I must confess to a temperament quite
capable of viewing such wooliness without particular discomfort.
170
It so happens, however, that it is possible to be a good deal more
explicit here, especially if due attention is paid to the archhierophant
himself. I refer of course (and without intending disrespect) to Pro-
fessor Llewellyn, whose influence on the section remains, in spite of
apparent dilution by other hands, perfectly unmistakable.
173. Id. 523 (footnotes omitted).
174. So far as Section 2-719 is concerned, it ought to be remembered, too, that its
Comment 1-as has already been noted--ues the word "unconscionable." And for a par-
ticular remedy limitation (not subject to disclaimer) expressly made answerable directly
to the requirements of Section 2-302. See section 2-718, Comment 1 (unreasonably small
liquidated damages).
175. Cf. Comment, Unconscionable Contracts: The Uniform Commercial Code, 45
IowA L. R . 843, 857-59 (1960); Sutton, Sales Warranties under the Sale of Goods Act
and the Uniform Commercial Code, 6 MELOURNE UNIV. L REV. 150, 176-77 (1957).
176. It is evident that the Code's draftsmen foresaw from the beginning a creative and
flexible role for the Courts. See, e.g., UCC § 1-102, Comment 1.
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Llewellyn's famous discussion of the "boilerplate" agreement 77 re-
volves around two central insights or hypotheses, inter-connected to
be sure, but distinguishable as operating on different levels of ab-
straction, The first is that of "transaction-types"-the view that trans-
actions are characterizable, and therefore segregable, by reference to
the "iron essence" of each type. "The picture is one of this or that
transaction-type as having . . an essence which contains a minimum
of balance, a core without which the type fails of being . ... "I"
Llewellyn intends more here than a metaphysical construct, of course:
the functional basis of the notion of transactional essence is rooted in
the expectations legitimately raised in the parties;17 just as is the
second point-the distinction between "dickered terms," which "con-
stitute the dominant and only real expression of agreement,"'' s0 and
the "supplementary boilerplate," containing terms which are accept-
able so long as they "do not alter or eviscerate the reasonable mean-
ing of the dickered terms."'' If we apply these ideas-as Llewellyn
surely proposed that they be applied 82
-to Section 2-302, and to the
particular problem at hand, there emerges a principle something like
this: A warranty disclaimer or remedy limitation which complies with
the requirements of Section 2-316 or Section 2-719 respectively is
nevertheless unconscionable if it is either (a) at odds with the "iron
essence" of that transaction-type known as the sale of goods, or (b)
an alteration or evisceration of "the reasonable meaning of the dick-
ered terms" of any given such transaction. According to this principle,
the ten Comment cases must be seen as instances of such conflict
177. K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADIrrION 362-71 (1960). Llewellyn's dis-
cussion, though prototypically applicable to form contracts, has always struck me asperfectly applicable, mutatis mutandum, to any kind of contract involving a sufficient
complex of terms to make a distinction between dickered essentials and ancillary residue
practicable.
178. Id. 368.
179. Cf. Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract,43 COLuM. L. REv. 629, 637 (1943): "In dealing with standardized contracts courts lavQto determine what the weaker contracting party could legitimately expect by way ofservices according to the enterpriser's 'calling,' and to what extent the stronger partydisappointed reasonable expectations based on the typical life situation." The "enter-priser's calling" is perhaps too narrow a referent: the "nature of the transaction" andits whole situational context must be taken account of, See also Patterson, supra note37, at 858.
180. K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 177, at 370.
181. Id. 370, The twin notions of transactional essence and dickered terms are oxplicitlymade a part of UCC § 2-313, comment 1, which distinguishes between "implied" ad
"express" warranties as being related to the former and latter respectively.182. It is true that the distinction between dickered deal and boilerplate is developedin terms of the scope of assent, but it is clear that Llewellyn regarded a solution in terms
of assent as an opportunity missed and gone, and Section 2-309 as an objectified sub.stitute therefor, albeit a less satisfying one. See K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 177, at 369.
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with essence, or evisceration of the dickered deal-which is, I sub-
mit, precisely what, on examination, they turn out to be.lta
Transactional essence, To those who are familiar with English nice-
ties in matters of contract law, it will at once be apparent that Llewel-
lyn's notion of "iron essence" has more than a passing resemblance
to the late lamented doctrine of "fundamental breach" or "funda-
mental terms" as developed by British courts chiefly in the post-war
era. The complexities and inscrutabilities of that doctrine are beyond
the scope of this paper: 1 4 suffice it to give a simple statement of the
thing:
Every contract contains a "core" or fundamental obligation which
must be performed. If one party fails to perform this funda-
mental obligation, he will be guilty of a breach of the contract
whether or not any exempting clause has been inserted which
purports to protect him.8 5
For instructions on conducting the quest for this unexcludable core,
one might quote Lord Denning, bate noir and general scapegoat of
English academe though he be:
The thing to do is to look at the contract apart from the exempt-
ing clauses and see what are the terms, express or implied, which
impose an obligation on the party. If he has been guilty of a
breach of those obligations in a respect which goes to the very
root of the contract, he cannot rely on the exempting clauses.
80
183. It is not to the point to say that these cases involve transgressions of the stan-
dards of merchantability and/or fitness for a particular purpose. The point is that they
do so to a degree which justifies analysis in terms of "fundamental breach."
Of course, if a transaction is conducted explicitly and unequivocally on the footing
that the seller assumes absolutely no liability whatsoever, we have moved from the area
of the sale of "goods" to that of the sale of "risks "-that is, from sale to gamble:
the parties, if they consciously desire, [can] make their own bargain if they wish.
But in determining what they have agreed upon good faith is a factor and considera-
tion should be given to the fact that the probability is small that a real price is
intended to be exchanged for a pseudo-obligation.
UCC § 2-813, comment 4.
184. For Anglo-Saxons they have, in any case, been considerately taken care of by the
House of Lords (Suisse Atlantique Socidtd D'Armement Maritime S.. v. NX.J. Totter-
damsche Kolen Centrale, [1967] I A.C. 361, is generally taken to have abrogated this
doctrine, although the opinions in the case are suficiently verbose to allow. of same doubt
in the matter), a fate which, for those who must breathe the air of stultificaton which
afflicts English contract law generally, was perhaps from the beginning only a matter of
time.
The details of the doctrine of fundamental breach occasioned, needless to say. a great
outpouring of literature. See, e.g., B. CooTE, ExctroN CLAusEs 104 et seq. (1964) and
citations therein. An American treatment of the doctrine appears in Meyer, Contracts of
Adhesion and the Doctrine of Fundamental Breach, 50 VA. L. REv. 1178 (1964). (For
a short discussion of UCC unconscionability in this context, see Meyer, supra, at 19).
See also Davenport, supra note 8, at 142-44.)
185. Guest, Fundamental Breath of Contract, 77 L.Q. REv. 98, 99 (1961).
186. Karsales Harron Ltd. v. Wallis, [1956] 1 W.L.R. 936, 940.
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In the field of sales much ingenuity was devoted to outlining the
precise nature of this "fundamental obligation." Some support devel-
oped for the view that the seller's obligation to convey good title
was such a fundamental term of the contract; 187 more relevant for our
purposes, however, and more generally assented to, was the proposi-
tion that the seller must, as a matter of fundamental obligation, deliv-
er goods of the "kind" contracted for-and a sufficient degree of de-
fectiveness tended to be regarded as establishing a difference in kind.88
A term was fundamental "if its breach substantially deprive[d] the
victim of what he bargained for":8 9 a disclaimer of warranties, there-
fore, would not excuse the seller if he supplied goods which deviated
drastically from the contract description.
If we turn now to the Comment cases of Section 2-302, the rel-
evance of the foregoing immediately strikes the eye. In Andrews Bros.
Bournemouth, Ltd. v. Singer & Co., 190 for instance (cited frequently
in the literature as an early "fundamental breach" decision),1" the
thing contracted for was a new car; the thing delivered was a used
one. Similarly in Meyer v. Packard Cleveland Motor Co. 92 what was
contracted for was a "dump truck"; what was delivered was unfit for
use as such. At least three of the remaining cases are analyzable in
similar terms.193
187. See Coote, supra note 185, at 61, and citations therein at 62 et seq.
188. The difficulties associated with this concept are of course as obvious as they
are ultimately insurmountable (as are those generated by other like distinctions, e.g.,
that between "substance" and "quality"). See, e.g., Williams, Language and the Law 1i1,
61 L.Q. R1v. 293, 303 (1945); Williams, Mistake as to the Party in the Law of Contract,
23 CANADIAN B. RV. 271 (1945). For discussion and annotation see Coote, supra note 186,
at 45 et seq.
189. G. TRmfrrL, THE LAW OF CONTRACr 161 (2d ed. 1966). Cf. Smeaton Hanscomb &
Co. v. Sassoon I. Setty, Son & Co., [1953] 1 W.L.R. 1468, 1470 (Devlin, J.):
I do not think what is a fundamental term has ever been closely defined .... It
is, I think, something which underlies the whole contract so that, if it is not com-plied with, the performance becomes something totally different from that which
the contract contemplates. If, for example, instead of delivering mahogany logs
the sellers delivered pine logs, and the buyers inadvertently omitted to have them
examined for 14 days, it might well be that the sellers could not rely on the time
clause.
190. [1934] 1 K.B. 17.
191. E.g., G. TPRTEL, supra note 190, at 161; G. CHESRE & C. FIFooT, THE LAW OF
CoNTRACr 241-43 (Australian ed. 1966).
192. 106 Ohio St. 328, 140 N.E. 118 (1922). Note the language of the court:
What was Meyer to get in return for his money? A toy truck, or a transportation
truck; a 5-ton dump truck merely in size or style, or was it to be a 5-ton dump truck
for the usual and ordinary service to which dump trucks are put? . . When a
man buys a horse he hardly needs a warranty that it is a horse, or that it is not
a mule or camel, though they belong to the same general family of burden
bearers ....
106 Ohio St. at 335-36; 140 N.E. at 120.
193. Austin Co. v. J.H. Tillman Co., 104 Or. 541, 209 P. 131 (1922) (new asphalt
mixing machine versus used machine defective in numerous respects and incapable of
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Thi concept of "difference in kind" between the thing contracted
for and that delivered is, therefore well represented. A warranty dis-
claimer or remedy limitation is of no avail in such cases because it
aspires-to the extent to which it seeks to justify fundamental devia-
tions of the sort referred to-to be more than itself, to modify the
"iron essence" of the sales contract of which it is a part and which
is, in fact, its raison d'6tre. And to the extent to which it thus seeks to
transcend itself, the court is entitled, under Section 2-302 to strike
it down or to limit its application, 194
May support for this proposition be drawn from the cases which
have 8o far utilized Section 2-302? Authority is admittedly scanty as
yet, but as far as it goes it is indeed confirmatory. In Zabriskie Chev-
rolet, Inc v. Smith, 95 the court had before it warranty disclaimers
substantially identical with those in issue in Henningsen v. Bloomfield
Motorsi96 The automobile in question had become inoperable be-
cause of a defective transmission within a short time after leaving the
dealer's premises. The buyer refused to accept a substitute transmis-
sion, and the dealer sued for the price. The court held for the de-
fendant, both because, with respect to the exempting provisions, the
requirements of Section 2-316(3) had not been complied with, and
because of the Henningsen doctrine:
Although Henningsen was decided prior to the effective date of
the Code, its basic concept that a technique such as the one
described herein is against public policy now finds statutory
support not only in 2-316(3), but also in . . . 2-302 (unconscion-
able contract or clause).97
producing agreed-upon quality and quantity: "the machine delivered failed in substantial
and vital particulars to correspond with the description in the contracL" 104 Or. at 553.
209 P. at 135); Robert A. Munroe & Co. v. Meyer, [1930] 2 K.B. 312 (adulterated meat
not cbrresponding with the contract description); Green v. Arcos, Ltd. (1931) 47 T.L.R.
336 (quantity of timber of varying classes in given proportions versus a quantity of
varying classes in entirely different proportions). It should be added that the famous
decision in Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, 32 NJ. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960). insofar
as it rests on public policy, must surely also be understood as something of an affirmation
of the notion of transactional essence.
194. The Code sets out from the beginning with the notion that the parties' powers
of "private legislation" do not extend to the modification of "the obligations of good faith.
diligence, reasonableness and care prescribed by this Act." UCC § 1-102(3).
195. 99 NJ. Super. 441, 240 A.2d 195 (1968).
196. 32 NJ. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960). Henningsen itself, of course, cites Section 2-301,
although the Code was not then in effect in New Jersey. The fact the major automobile
companies (Chrysler in Henningsen, General Motors in Zabriskie) remained unmo ed is
perhaps a warning that this decision is ultimately not as unambiguous as it has often been
taken to be, and that the "fall of the citadel" cannot, perhaps, be dated with total
precision after all. See Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer).
50 MiNN. L. Rv 791 (1966). Cf. Hall v. Everett Motors, Inc., 340 Mass. 430, 165 N.E2d
107, 109 (1960), another pre-Code case concerned with the automobile manufacturers'
limitation-of-liability clause.
197. 99 N.J. Super. at 447, 240 A.2d at 199 (1968).
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That we are here concerned with "transactional essence" should be
obvious. Tender of the vehicle with a substitute transmission "not
from the factory and of unknown lineage" would, said the court,
involve "a chattel not within the agreement or contemplation of the
parties ... ."198 A similar situation arose in Vlases v. Montgomery
Ward & Co.,' 99 a Third Circuit decision involving an action brought
by the buyer of one-day old chickens which some nine months after
the date of purchase had to be destroyed because of infection with
avian leukosis. The buyer based his action on the implied warran-
ties of merchantability and of fitness for a particular purpose pro-
vided for in the Code. The seller asserted several defenses based
on the nature of the disease involved and the circumstances in gen-
eral. The court held that liability under the implied warranty sec-
tions was strict and avoidable only by modification or exclusion in
accordance with the provisions of Section 2-316. In the course of his
opinion, McLaughlin, J., added:
Even a provision specifically disclaiming any warrant against avian
leukosis would not necessarily call for the defendant's freedom
from liability. Section 1-102(3) of the Code's General Provisions
states that standards which are manifestly unreasonable may not
be disclaimed [sic] and prevents the enforcement of unconscion-
able sales where, as in this instance, the goods exchanged are
found to be totally worthless.20 0
It is true that Section 1-102 does not itself contain the word "un-
conscionable," but it makes reference to "the obligations of good
faith, diligence, reasonableness and care prescribed by this Act," and
thus to Section 2-302 itself.20'
Evisceration. The distinction between "evisceration" of the "dick-
ered deal" and deviation from transactional essence is, as has already
been intimated, a somewhat arbitrary one; with respect to both con-
198. 99 N.J. Super. at 450, 240 A.2d at 205.
199. 377 F.2d 846 (3d Cir. 1967).
200. 377 F.2d at 350.
201. Two other cases (involving lease agreements, be it noted) citing Section 2-302
in connection with warranty disclaimers are Fairfield Lease Corp. v. Colonial Aluminum
Sales Inc., 3 UCC REx. SERV. 858 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966), and Electronics Corp. of America
v. Lear Jet Corp., 286 N.Y.S.2d 711 (1967); the issue in both cases, however, was whether
a motion for summary judgment should be granted (on both occasions it was not), and
there was no discussion of the merits. See also William v. American Motor Sales Co., 44
Erie Co. L.J. 51 (Pa. C.P. 1961), in which the court held a disclaimer clause ineffcctive
to exclude the warranty of merchantability. Although relying on non-compliance with
Section 2-316(2) and (3)(a), the court adverted to the possibility that Section 2-302 might
be of overriding effect: Id. 57 n.3.
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cepts the legitimate expectations of the parties are the heart of the
matter. With respect to sales, "difference in kind" is an institution-
alization of such expectations. Beyond the central core of transactional
essence, however, lies a shadowier area in which arguments based on
the particularities of the deal in question may be given some play.
There can be little doubt that the term "surprise -"2 02 in Comment
1 of Section 2-302 was meant to supply the dramatic focus here. The
question to be asked is roughly this: is the contended-for application
of clause X to the situation before the court so much at odds with
the overall tenor of the particular deal as to be unfairly surprising?
Such a question will often arise in cases where the seller "has rea-
son to know [the] particular purpose for which the goods are re-
quired and that the buyer is relying on the seller's skill and judg-
ment to select or furnish suitable goods."2 03 In such circumstances-
absent a disclaimer-Section 2-315 of the Code implies an appropriate
warranty. To rely, in circumstances where the seller has behaved in such
a way as to reinforce the presumption of such a warranty, on a clause
excluding it, may be unconscionable even if that clause was, in ac-
cordance with Section 2-316(2), "in writing and conspicuous"--because
the dominant "meaning" of the transaction is to be derived from the
manifest intention of the parties and not from the paraphernalia (at
least where there is a conflict between them).204 That, one supposes, is
the lesson to be extracted from Bekkevold v. Potts,20 cited by the drafts-
men.
But the circumstances in which the buyer may plead legitimate sur-
prise are, after all, infinite. In Kansas City Wholesale Grocery Co.
v. Weber Packing Corporation- O° for instance, the ten-day time lim-
itation for claims in respect of the catsup there in question might have
struck the buyer as perfectly reasonable-so long as it applied to de-
fects discoverable by ordinary means such as sight, taste, and smell.
He might, however, legitimately have claimed that its application to
202. Professor Left, it should be noted, concedes the utility of "surprise" as a dra-
matic device, albeit in another context. Left 498. "Surprise" as a catchword also occurs
in UCC § 2-612, Comment 4.
203. UCC § 2-315.
204. Cf. UCC § 2-313, comment 4. Nowadays, of course, the bu)yer's impression of what
he is getting may well have been created by means of modem advertising techniques.
See the references to the modem "marketing milieu" in Henningsen, 32 NJ. at 358. 161
A.2d at 83-84; cf. Patterson, supra note 37, at 860.
205. 173 Minn. 87, 216 N.V. 790 (1927).
206. 93 Utah 414, 73 P.2d 1272 (1937). Cf. Hardy v. General Motors Acceptance Corp.,
38 Ga. App. 463, 144 S.E. 327 (1928), also cited in Comment 1, where the question was
again one of latent defects.
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latent defects discoverable only "by ?L careful microscopic examina-
tion"207 was a surprise indeed, And a buyer's use of a clause
permitting the seller, upon the buyer's failure to supply ship-
ping instructions, to cancel, ship, or allow delivery date to be in-
definitely postponed 30 days at a time by the inaction
to postpone indefinitely the date of measuring damages for his own
breach is, of course, a somewhat unexpected ploy, too.208 Although
no case using Section 2-302 has yet invoked the "evisceration" the-
ory,20 9 such decisions should not be long in coming.
Postscript. It may be objected that the foregoing analysis runs
counter to the express requirement of Section 2-302 that unconscion-
ability, in order to be "actionable," must exist "at the time [the con-
tract] was made." If, after all, the alleged unconscionability lies not
in the fact of a clause's existence, but in the claim to extend its appli-
cation in such a way as to eviscerate the "fundamental" or "dickered"
207. 73 P.2d at 1275. Cf. Wilson Trading Corp. v. David Ferguson, Ltd., 5 UCC REP.
SERv. 1213 (N.Y. Ct. of App. l9q8), discussed in note 209 infra.
208. Cf. Kansas Flour Mills Co. v. Dirks, 100 Kan. 376, 164 P. 273 (1917), also cited
in Comment 1. But see Leff 526 n.155.
209. But see Wilson Trading Corp. Y. David Ferguson, Ltd., 5 UCC REP. SrRv. 1213
(N.Y. Ct. App. 1968), involving a contract for the sale of yam, as to which the buyer
alleged latent defects not discoverable until after the yarn had been made into sweaters.
The seller, in suing for the price, relied on non-compliance by the buyer with a clause
disallowing claims made more than ten days after delivery. The court held that if the
buyer's allegations were true the time-limitation clause would be ineffective under
UCC § 2-719(2) (circumstances causing a limitation of remedy "to fail of its essential
purpose"). The majority (6-1) opinion dearly holds, however, that Section 2.302 is
applicable to remedy limitations in principle. See 5 UCC REP. Srtv. at 1216. It expressly
disapproves of Vandenberg & Sons, N.V. v. Siter, 204 Pa. Super. 392, 2 UCO RE',, SE.5'.
383 (1964), in which the Superior Court of Pennsylvania dealt with a time-limltation
clause in terms of "manifest unreasonableness" under UCC § 1-204, without mentioning
Section 2-302. See 5 UCC REP. SEuv. at 1216 n.1. (Siter was followed, it should be noted,
in Neville Chemical Co. v. Union Carbide Corp., 5 UCC REr. SERV. (W.D. Pa. 1968).)
In Granite Worsted Mills Inc. v. Aaronson Cowen Ltd., 5 UCC REP. StRy. 98 (1968),
the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, affirmed an arbitrator's award granting
a buyer of textiles damages in disregard of a provision of the contract which limited
damages to "the difference in value on date of delivery between goods specified and goods
actually delivered." Buyer's argument before the arbitrator appears to have been based
in part on unconscionable surprise in the light of trade usage. The court affirmed tile
arbitrator's award on grounds of "scope" without reference to the merits.
A case which might well have gone off on the theory of "evisceration" is Henry v.
W.S. Reichenbach & Son, Inc., 45 Pa. D. 9: C.2d 171, 5 UCO RE'. SEar. 985 (1968). De-
fendant had agreed to convert plaintiff's heating system from steam to hot water. Tile
printed-form contract was supplemented by a typed-in clause stipulating that the work
"be done in a neat and workmanship like [sic] manner and guaranteed for one year."
When defects became manifest five months afterwards, defendant sought to rely on an-
other clause excluding liability in sweeping terms. The court held this latter clause
inapplicable on interpretive grounds. "Where an express warranty is added to a printed
form agreement . . . the rights accruing from that warranty will not be limited
or defeated by the printed general conditions unless such an Intention is spelled out
clearly and certainly." That this way of deciding the issue is in the worst "draftsman-
hit-me-again" tradition should be clear. See note 171 supra; Davenport, supra note 7, at
144-46.
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meaning of the transaction, the claim must of necessity be made in
response to a situation which did not exist at the time of contract-
ing. But this is to mistake the argument somewhat. What precisely
does the party invoking the warranty disclaimer or remedy limitation
assert about its scope and meaning? He asserts, necessarily, that it was
always and manifestly intended to cover (inter alia, it may be) con-
tingencies such as the one before the court. Thus the question may be
seen as arising conceptually at the time of contracting. And the court,
in denying the applicability of the clause to the contingency before
it, is in effect saying that, insofar as the clause was intended to cover
that contingency, it was unconscionable from its inception and must
be limited, or struck down, accordingly.21 0
c. Other Specific Clauses
The principles of "transactional essence" and "evisceration" have
without doubt implications going beyond the context of exculpatory
clauses, and there is no reason why they should not be invoked with
respect to other contractual provisions, including some of those dis-
cussed below.2 11 With respect to these, however, it will be seen that
the principles drawn upon for decision in the cases are most com-
monly extra-contractual in coloring. I have therefore thought it best,
at this stage of scanty authority, to refrain from procrustean chop-
ping and lopping and to adhere to the terms of the discussion as set
by the courts themselves.
Submission to Foreign Jurisdiction. On three occasions the New
York courts have dealt with a clause in a contract for home improve-
ments by which the buyer agreed to submit to a foreign jurisdiction
as the forum of legal redress.2 12 In each case the forum selected was
New York, although the corporate plaintiff and the defendant were
both resident elsewhere. In Paragon Homes of New England, Inc. v.
Langlois,21 3 both the corporation and the defendants were residents
of Massachusetts, where the contract had been executed and breached.
In Paragon Homes of Midwest, Inc. v. Crace, 214 plaintiff was an Indi-
210. Cf. Skilton 8: Helstad, Protection of the Installment Buyer of Goods Under theUniform Commercial Code, 65 MAica. L. REv. 1465, 1474 (1967).
211. It seems to me, in fact, very desirable that they should be so invoked, not onlyfor the sake of doctrinal elegance, but so as firly to alichor future decisions ps to par-ticular contractual terms in the root notions underlying Section 2-302.
212. The clause read: "This agreement shall be deemed to have been made in NassauCounty, New York, and the parties . ..hereby submit to the jurisdiction of the Su-preme Court, Nassau County, New York, for the purpose of adjudication of all their
respective rights and liabilities hereunder."
213. 4 UCC RE. SExv. 16 (N.Y. Sup. CL 1967).
214. 4 UCC RE. Smv. 19 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1967).
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ana corporation authorized to do business in Wisconsin, and defend-
ants were residents of Wisconsin, where the contract had been ex-
ecuted and breached. In both cases the court held that the doctrine
of forum non conveniens overrode any consensual arrangement of
the parties, since the forum selected was "haphazardly agreed upon"
and "actually unsuitable," 21r and there was no "discernible reason"
for the parties' choice.210 The court went on, however, to add that
the clause ...was inserted by the plaintiff in its printed form
of contract for the purpose of harassing and embarrassing the
defendants in the prosecution or defense of any action arising
thereunder. This is not a case involving parties situated on an
equal basis. The plaintiff is engaged in a commercial enterprise
for profit, whereas the materials purchased by defendants was not
bought for use in a business or for resale. The procurement of
defendants' consent to New York as the forum for legal redress
is, under the peculiar circumstances disclosed, without justifica-
tion, grossly unfair and unconscionable. Such clause would be
stricken as a matter of law (UCC § 2-302(1) were not the action
dismissed on other grounds.
21 7
In Paragon Homes, Inc. v. Carter2 18 Paragon Homes of New Eng-
land, Inc. had, after dismissal of its action for breach on grounds of
the forum non conveniens principle, assigned its rights under the
contract with Carter to the present plaintiff, a New York corporation.
The issue being thus squarely put to the court, Brennan, J., after
quoting the passage from the Langlois and Grace cases extracted
above, held that Section 2-302 alone was an adequate ground for
decision.
What may heretofore have been dictum is now made the decision
of the court. Without the imposition of the grossly unfair and
unconscionable jurisdictional clause this court lacks jurisdiction
over the defendants and the complaint is dismissed.
210
As the quotation from Langlois and Grace indicated, these earlier
opinions somewhat scatter their shot in their manner of invoking
Section 2-302. Matters of bargaining conduct (printed form), bargain-
ing position (commercial enterprise versus home-owner), and bad
215. 4 UCC REP. SERV. at 18, 21. The opinions in the two cases are substantially
identical.
216. 4 UCC REP. SERV. at 18, 20.
217. 4 UCC RFP. SERv. at 19, 21.
218. 4 UCC REP. S.Rv. 1144 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1968), afJd without opinion, 5 UCC
REP. SERV. 991 (N.Y. App. Div. 1968).
219. 4 UCC REP. SEav. at 1145.
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faith (harassment and embarrassment) are rather indiscriminately
thrown together. It is difficult not to feel, however, that the last-
named factor is predominant, and that the prefunctoriness of the
court with respect to the others savors of ritual incantation rather
than close factual scrutiny. Suppose the parties here had "dickered"
over the forum clause: would the decision have been different?
Given the "motive" of harassment and embarrassment, I should
say (albeit somewhat nervously): no. The principle seems to boil
down to something like this: a clause of the kind here under discus-
sion is unconscionable unless a bona fide reason can be advanced for
its presence. Whether bona fide reasons exist is, of course, a matter
of external evidence; the fact that the hearing provision of Section
2-302(2) was given no play in the Paragon Homes cases is presum-
ably an indication of the fact that everybody knew no such reasons
existed.
Repossession Under Installment Contracts. The contract clause in
issue in Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co.20 provided that
payments made by the purchaser "shall be credited pro rata on all
outstanding leases, bills and accounts due" at the time of payment;
the effect being "to keep a balance due on every item purchased until
the balance due on all items, whenever purchased, was liquidated."22 1
Although the majority opinion is replete with phrases like "com-
mercially unreasonable contract"2t'- and "terms which are unreason-
ably favorable to one party,"22 the tenor of the whole is very
much "procedural" in emphasis, and it would be oversanguine to
perceive in the case any real leaning towards the-after all not in-
herently implausible-view that add-on clauses of the kind at stake
here are substantively unconscionable per se.
The New York Supreme Court was somewhat less tactful 224 with
respect to a related issue in Robinson v. Jefferson Credit Corp.225
In that case the defendant corporation (the seller's assignee) had re-
possessed a car as to which plaintiff-purchaser was at the time con-
cededly in arrears. Although plaintiff paid over the arrears plus late
charges and a repossession fee very shortly afterwards, defendant nev-
ertheless declined to return the car, apparently because it anticipated
220. 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
221. Id. at 447.
222. Id. at 449.
223. Id.
224. So perhaps instancing the difference between higher and lower judicial hierarchies
to which I referred earlier. See p. 792 supra.
225. 4 UCO REP. SERV. 15 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1957).
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future defaults. Not unnaturally the plaintiff refused to make fur-
ther payments, and the defendant relied on these newly-incurred ar-
rears at the trial, The court granted plaintiff's motion for return
of the car (on condition that all arrears be extinguished), saying:
Unconscionable conduct is proscribed by the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, and defendant's conduct herein, even if allowed
under the contract between the parties, cannot withstand com-
parison to the requisite standard of commercially reasonable con-
duct required under the code.226
Presumably this somewhat problematical statement means, inter alia,
that hfd the contract contained a clause explicitly authorizing the
defendant's refusal to return the automobile, 27 that fact would have
been unavailing. If this view is correct, Robinson suggests the propo-
sition that a clause entitling the repossesor to retain possession even
after arrears and attendant fees22 8 have been discharged may be held
to be tinconscionable independent of matters of bargaining or over-
all imbalance.2 29
It might well be expedient to extend this view to the Walker-
Thomas type of clause as well, the hedging of the court in that case
notwilthstanding.230 Repossession is a potent weapon; the frequency
of assighment in the field of donsutmer installment contracts has
meant that it is often wielded inequitably and indiscriminately. The
policing of contractual provisions in this area by way of Section
2-302 may provide a valuable counterthrust.
Waiver of Defence Against Assignee. The frequency of assignment
in the field of installment contracts raises its own peculiar prob-
lems. If the contract assigned is unconscionable either in Whole or in
part, the assignee's rights are, of course, extinguished or diminished
accordingly.23 ' Suppose, however, that the buyer waives, as against
226. 4 UCC RiEs. SER ,.at 16.
227. It is not tlear whether in fact there was such a clause.
228. Of course the nature and amount of such fees may in themselves raise the Issue
of unconscionability. Cf. Consumers Time Credit, Inc. v. Remark Corp., 259 F.Supp. 185
(ED. Pa. 1966), where an attorney's collection fee of 15 per cent, provided for by a clause
of the financihg agreement there in question, was held unconscionable as a matter of
equity law and the rate of 5 per cent substituted.
229. Cf. Autocar Sales v. Sansone, 20 Erie Co. L.J. 210, 86 Pittsb. Leg. J. 570, 18
A.L.R.3d 1311 n. (Pa. C.P. 1938), a pre-Code case in which a contract provision that on
repossession the lessor might sell the automobile in question without notice to the lessee
and proceed against the latter for any balance was held unenforceable as beig uncon-
scionable.
230. Professor Leff would not, one gathers, agree; he draws attention to the fact that
as of 1965, of the "twenty-seven jurisdictions which have statutes regulating retail install-
ment sales, only one has a provision making add-on clatises impermissible." Leff 554.
Perhaps that is one of the reasons why a provision like Section 2-302 was urgently needed.
231. See, e.g., the ITM case, 52 Misc. 2d 39, 275 N.Y.S.2d 303 (1966).
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the assignee, those defences which he might have invoked against the
seller. Such a clause was in issue in Unico v. Owen.-32 There the
buyer had, as part of an installment purchase transaction, executed
a note of which the plaintiff, a financing company closely associated
with the vendor, claimed to be holder in due course under the Uni-
fora Negotiable Instruments Law. 3 The Supreme Court of New
Jersey held, for reasons not relevant here, that th1e plaintiff could
not be regarded as such a holder. The plaintiff argued that he was
nevertheless entitled to payment qua assignee of the contract of sale,
and that he was so entitled even though the vendor had failed to make
delivery, on the basis of the following clause contained in that contract:
Buyer hereby acknowledges notice that this contract may be
assigned and . . . agrees that the liability of the Buyer to any
assignee shall be immediate and absolute and not affected by any
default whatsoever of the Seller .... [I]n order to induce assignees
to purchase this contract, the Buyer further agrees not to set up
any claim against such Seller as a defense, counterclaim or offset
to any action by any assignee ....
The court held this clause to be unenforceable as contrary to public
policy. It went on, however, to consider the applicability of the rele-
vant Code provisions. After pointing out that Section 9-206(l),34
which seems at first sight to assume the validity of waiver clauses,
is by its own terms subject "to any statute or decision which estab-
lishes a different rule for the buyer of consumer goods," the court
continued:
In this section of the Code, the Legislature recognized the pos-
sibility of need for special treatment of waiver clauses in con-
sumer contracts .... And section 9-206 in the area of consumer
goods sales must as a matter of policy be deemed closely linked
with section -302 . . . . We see in the enactment of these two
sections of the Code an intention to leave in the hands of the
courts the continued application of common law principles in
232. 50 N.J. 101, 232 A.2d 405 (1967).
233. The UCC had not yet taken effect in New Jersey at the time of the execution of
the note in question.
234. That section reads:
Subject to any statute or decision which establishes a different rule for buyers or
lessees of cornumer goods, an agreement by a buyer or lessee that he will not assert
against an assignee any claim or defense which he may have against the seller or
lessor is enforceable by an assignee who takes his assignment for value, in good
faith and without notice of a claim or defense, except as to defenses of a type which
may be asserted against a holder in due course of q negotiable instrument under
the Article on Commercial Paper [Article 3]. A buyer who as part of one transaction
signs both a regotiable instrument and a security agreement makes such an agree-
ment.
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deciding in consumer goods cases whether such waiver clauses
as the one imposed on Owen in this case are so one-sided as to
be contrary to public policy.2
35
Although the court referred to certain bargaining aspects of the
transaction, its objections to the clause on grounds of "public policy"
were expressly stated to be "regardless" of them; and Section 2-302
was thought to be applicable in the same way.230 We have here, there-
fore, authority for the view that waivers of this kind may be uncon-
scionable per se; indeed, the court's language may to some observers
suggest an even less equivocal approach.
237
III. Going Beyond Sales
The precise scope of the Sales Article of the Code is a matter to
which relatively little attention seems to have been paid; I do not
propose here to enter into the difficulties which may be conjured up
by a consideration of the phrase "transaction in goods" as it is used
in Section 2-102.23s If the Code follows the pattern of earlier codifying
statements and enactments in American legal history (and it bids fair
to do so), it will in time become part of the general jurisprudence
of the nation. In the case of Section 2-302 in particular, it may be
confidently predicted that the range of its application will be a con-
stantly expanding one.239 It has already-as we have seen-been ap-
235. 50 N.J. at 125, 232 A.2d at 418. Cf. Fairfield Lease Corp. v. Colonial Aluminum
Sales Inc., 3 UCC REP. SEav. 858 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966), where "consumer unconscionability"
reasoning was held inapplicable to a clause waiving defences against the assignee of a
lease.
236. 50 NJ. at 123, 232 A.2d at 417.
237. The issues raised by Unico have, of course, a long and extensive pre.Code history,
with which I have not concerned myself. For references to the cases and to the literature,
see R. Steffen, CAsEs ON COMMERCIAL AND INvEsrMENT PAPER, 812-31 (2d ed. 1954).
Another type of clause which could raise the issue of substantive unconsconablilty
is the provision for waiver of jury trial. A clause waiving the right to trial by jury in the
event of litigation, subscribed to by the plaintiff when opening a checking account with
the defendant bank, was held unenforceable in David v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust
Co., 4 UCC REP. Sav. 1145 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1968). There is, however, no doubt that as a
matter of law such waivers by contract are permissible, although the courts have tra-
ditionally applied strict interpretative standards in this area. See the cases cited by sile
court at id. 1149-50. That an open invocation of unconscionability may, under some
circumstances, be the preferable tactic goes without saying, but the decision in David
was based squarely (and legitimately) on matters of bargaining conduct, and thus raises
no issue of substantive (much less per se) unconscionability.
238. For a comprehensive summary of case-law to date, see Annot., 17 A.L.R.8d 1010,
1047 (1968).
239. Cf. 5A A. CoRBIN, CoNiRAcrs § 1164, at 223 (1964): "Wherever this section Is made
applicable to contracts for the sale of goods, no court should fail to make It applicable
to all other contracts; for the policy that it adopts is applicable to all alike." Cf. Com-
ment, Unconscionable Sales Contracts and the Uniform Commercial Code, Section 2.302,
45 VA. L. REv. 583, 590-91 (1959). Comment, The Uniform Commercial Code as a Premisefor Judicial Reasoning, 65 COLUM. L.R. 880, 892 (1965).
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plied or half-applied to financing transactions24O leases (both of realestate241 and of chattels24), and guarantee agreements.-2 43 A furtherexample of such expansion, which, in view of its importance, deservesto be discussed at some length, is supplied by Sinkoff v. Schlitz Brew-ing Co.,2-44 a recent case applying Section 2-302 to a distributorship
or franchise agreement.
Problems associated with the duration and termination of fran-chise agreements (especially in the autombile dealers field) have beenextensively canvassed in the literature.-45 Where such agreementscontain clauses allowing termination at will and without notice, suchclauses have, in general, been accepted by the courts at face value.It is, however, perfectly feasible to argue that termination of a rela-tionship such as that between manufacturer and distributor-a rela-tionship which, to the knowledge of both parties at its inception, willnecessarily involve a substantial investment of time and money, espe-cially on the distributor's part, and the sudden termination of whichmay therefore do more than the usual amount of harm-should not,as a matter of public policy, be effected arbitrarily and without no-tice even where an express clause of the contract seeks to authorize
such a termination.246
In Bushwick-Decatur Motors v. Ford Motor Co.,2 47 perhaps the best-known decision in the field, the Second Circuit refused to accept thisline of reasoning with respect to a dealer's claim that termination
ought to be allowed only in "good faith." In the course of his opinionJudge Clark wrote:
240. Elkins-Dell, 253 F. Supp. 864 (E.D. Pa. 1966), discussed at TAN 99-111 supra;Whitestone Credit Corp. v. Barbory Realty Corp., 5 UCO Rx'. SER". 176 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1068).But cf. In re Advance Printing 
- Litho. Co., 277 F. Supp. 101 (W.D. Pa. 1967), a0f'd. 387F.2d 952 (3d Cir. 1967); Hernandez v. S.I.C. Finance Co., 5 UCC REP. SrRv. 1151, 1154(N.M. 1968). It should be noted that the National Bankruptcy Conference has proposedthat Chapter XIII of the Bankruptcy Act be amended so as to indude an unconsciots.ability provision, under which an overreaching creditor's daim would be subordinated tothe claims of other creditors. See Countryman, Proposed New Amendments to ChapterXIII, 22 Bus. LAw. 1151, 1157-58 (1967).241. Fairfield Lease Corp. v. Colonial Aluminium Sales, Inc., 3 UCC Rzr. SER. 858(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966).242. Electronics Corp. of America v. Lear Jet Corp., 55 Misc. 2d 1066, 286 N.Y.S.2d711 (1967); cf. E.F. Lynch, Inc. v. Picciri i, 28 Mass. App. Dec. 49, 5 UCC Rn. SrV. 830(1964).243. State Bank of-Albany v. Hickey, 29 App. Div. 2d 993, 288 N.YS.2d 980 (1968).244. 51 Misc. 2d 446, 273 N.Y.S.2d 364 (1966).245. Extensive citation is unnecessary here. For a recent compendium, as well as someinteresting speculations, see Hewitt, Termination of Dealer Franchises and the Code-Mixing Classified and Coordinated Uncertainty with Conflict, 29 Bus. Ls. 1075 (1967).246. For a collection of more recent cases "indicating that some courts are more willingto look behind franchise terms and to consider economic and equitable consideratiots,-
see id. 1080-82.
247. 116 F.2d 675 (2d Cir. 1940).
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With a power of termination at will here so unmistakably 
ex,
pressed, we certainly cannot assert that a limitation 
of good faith
was anything the parties had in mind. Such a limitation 
can be
read into the agreement only as an overriding 
requirement of
public policy. Thig seems ah extreme step for 
judges to take.
... To attempt to redress this balance [between the strong 
bar-
gaining position of the manufacturers 
and the weak one of the
dealers] b udicial action without legislative 
authority appears
to us a doubtful policy. We have not proper facilities 
to weigh
economic factors, nor have we before us a showing 
of the sup-




It seems reasonable to argue that the requisite 
legislative utterance
has now been made in the shape of the Code's 
unconscionability
section,249 and that the hearing provision of that 
section now makes
possible the "showing of the supposed needs" in the 
absence of which
Judge Clark thought it improper to intervene.
In Sinkoff v. Schlitz Brewing Go.,
250 the court had before it a mo-
tion for a preliminary injunction to enjoin the defendant corpora-
tion from terminating a distributorship agreement 
with the plaintiff.
The agreement contained a clause providing that 
either party might
terminate without Cause or notice. When Schlitz 
terminated the agree-
ment accordingly,251 plaintiff sought an injunctioni, arguing 
that
he was entitled, despite the termination clause, 
to "reasonable no-
tice."2 52 In support, the plaintiff alleged expansion of his business 
in
reliance on the continuation of the distributorship, 
as well as the
threat of bankruptcy if it were suddenly discontinued. 
He relied
specifically on UCC § 2-309(3), which, in the absence of termination
248. 116 F.2d at 677. The court referred to the 
Wisconsin dealer's.day-In'cotrt act,
WIs. ST. § 218-01(g)(a)(17) (1937), as suggesting "the proper 
source of remedy, If one Is
needed.' 116 F.2d at 677.
249. Other tections of relevance ate Sections 1-102(3) (obligation 
of good faith and
reasonableness not disciaimable) and 2-306 (duty of good faith 
in requirements contracts),
as well as the termination provisions of Section 2-309 
referred to below.
In the case of automobile dealers' franchises, it might 
be argued that tht AJTOMontLu.
DEALER FRANCHISE ACT OF 1956, 70 Stat. 1125 (1950), 15 US.G. 
§§ 1221-25 (196-), has
already pre-emipted the field. But that Act thields the 
dealer only against manufacturers'
coercion and not against arbitrary termination. This has 
prompted doubts as to whether
the Act has chaed the ositid. of the dealer at all. 
See, e.g., Cothment, The Autlonso-
bile Dealer Franchise Act of 1956-An Evaluation, 48 CORNELL 
L.Q. 711, 741 (1963). Bat
I am conscious of paying only perfunctory attention 
to a problem which has occasioned
a large volume of specialized literature. My intention 
here is only to suggest that UCO
§ 2_102 should be mined for all it is worth in the franchise 
field.
250. 51 Misc. 2d 446, 273 N.S.24 8164 (1966).
251. Actually, Schlitz gave 10 days' notice, and alleged 
prior complaints.
252. Plaintiff stiggested that in this case a "reasonable" 
period would be one year.
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on an "agreed event," requires reasonable notice, and provides that
"an agreement dispensing with notification is invalid if its operation
would be unconscionable."
Stanislaw, J., without considering whether a distributorship agree-
ment like the one before him might be categorized as a "transaction
in goods" (or whether, if it might not, the Code might legitimately
be extended to cover it), took as his point of reference not Section
2-309(3), but Section 2-302 (an unexceptionable tactic insofar as the
former section utilizes "unconscionability" as a criterion of validity).
He went on to hold that, in view of Section 2-302's requirement that
unconscionability, to be operative, must exist at the time the con-
tract was made, the plaintiff's business activities after the making of
the agreement were irrelevant. In the absence of "data relevant to
conditions existing when the contract was executed," it was possible
that "the mere creation of any relationship between Sinkoff and
Schlitz was, at that first point in time, of great benefit to both and
perhaps even particularly favorable (and thus especially inoppressive)
to Sinkoff."2 5 3 Plaintiff's motion was accordingly denied without
prejudice.
Although this opinion is analytically highly vulnerable,2 5 its value
for present purposes lies in its underlying premises: (a) that Section
2-302 is applicable to distributorship agreements (and, presumably, to
others like them), and (b) that, had the requisite "data" been available,
the termination clause might have been found unconscionable under
the Section. 55 Now, from the view that conscionability may require,
in the case of distributorship agreements, termination clauses in-
corporating a provision for "reasonable notice," it is a decidedly un-
253. 51 Misc. 2d at 448, 273 N.Y.S.2d at 366.
254. The errors in reasoning seem to me to be: (a) If the termination clause is
asserted to be applicable to the contingency before the court, then the assertion must be
that it wag always intended to embrace that contingency, even "at the time when the
contract was made." Cf. my argument with respect to fundamental breach and uwarnt)'
disclaimers, p. 803 supra. (b) In any case, Section 2-309(g), primarily relied on by the
plaintiff, dearly looks to circumstances not only at the time of making the contract, but
afterwards. See Comment 8 (an agreement dispensing with notice is valid "unless the
results of putting it into operation would be the creation of an unconscionable state of
affairs" (emphasis added)). (c) Moreover, so far as Section 2-802 is concerned, the question
is not Whether the "relationship" created by the contract was or was not of benefit to
the complainant. The question is whether the clause in question-here the termination
clause-was unconscionable under the circumstances at that time. Here, reliance on the
distributorshLip, etc., might well have been argued to have been foreseeable at the time of
making the contract.
255. Cf. Summers, "Good Faith" in General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of
the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. Rv. 195, 282 (1968).
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gigantic step-or so it seems to me-to the position that there must
also be further provision for reasonable criteria by which the validity
of the act of termination itself may be judged. 25 6 That a long-standing
franchise agreement should be terminable, as it was held terminable in
Bushwick-Decatur, quite irrespective of motive or even good faith,
seems to me wholly at odds with the moving spirit of Section 2-302 (or,
for that matter, of Section 2-309). Termination clauses which permit
such unilateral oppression should, I submit, be regarded as prima facie
unconscionable-subject always of course, to vindication by explana-
tory and exculpatory evidence as to "commercial setting, purpose
and effect."
IV. The Hearing Provision
I have had frequent occasion, in the preceding pages, to refer to
the hearing provision contained in Section 2-302(2) as a means of
tempering first inclinations derived from the face of a contract. 25 7 It
might be supposed that the usefulness of such a provision would be
self-evident, even if one is not inclined to make extravagant claims in
the matter. Professor Leff, however, is strongly critical of it. His cen-
tral258 objection seems to be this: Suppose that, when called to the
witness stand, the seller explains a given term of the contract (price,
add-on repossession clause, warranty disclaimer, to take examples
chosen by Professor Leff himself) as being simply designed to increase
profits, as an "edge" in his favor in that respect.
256. In formulating those criteria, the draftsman should pay due attention to--
perhaps unfortunate-line of decisions suggesting that phrases like "for good cause" are
too imprecise to be given effect by the courts. See citations given in the Bushwick-Decatur
case, 116 F.2d at 677-78.
257. UCC § 2-302(2) reads:
When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or any clause thereof
may be unconscionable the parties shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to
present evidence as to its commercial setting, purpose and effect to aid the court
in making the determination.
That this provision is mandatory rather than directory would seem to be clear from its
wording. See E.F. Lynch, Inc. v. Piccirilli, 28 Mass. App. Dec. 49, 5 UCC REI.. Stay. 830(1964); cf. Sinkoff Beverage Co. v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 51 Misc. 2d 446, 448, 278
N.Y.S.2d 364, 366 (1966); 1 Anderson's Uniform Commercial Code 2-302:5.
258. It is difficult to separate the various strands of Professor Leff's argunent here.
He complains also that Section 2-302(2) is of little help in identifying unconsconability
"because a warranty disclaimer is not 'like' a remedy limitation, and both of them are
not 'like,' say, a choice-of-law provision. Any of these clauses might well be regulated,
but one cannot decide any of the questions relevant to the form of that regulation so
long as one is trying not to decide a question of social policy but to flesh out an incanta-
tion." Leff 546. It seems to me perfectly possible to "flesh out" even "incantations" by
way of deciding issues of social policy.
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[H]ow does a court decide if taking that particular edge is not to
be permitted if in its "commercial setting" its "purpose and effect"
is to increase a party's profits?25 9
Professor Leff himself suggests as possible aids to such a decision testi-
mony as to the "profit picture" of the industry or of the particular
party involved, or as to the party's "competitive position vis-zk-vis his
competitors," only to reject them as unsuitable.2
Since Professor Leff fails to give reasons for rejecting such testimony,
it is difficult to do more than indicate one's dissent from his view. Why
shouldn't a court seek to inquire into prevailing price levels with
respect to a given appliance, or into the kind of clientele, the particular
local environment, or the relative economic strengths and weaknesses
of the business in issue?2 1 Walker-Thomas, after all, might conceiv-
ably have established, by suitable evidence, that if they did not take
repossession measures of the stringent kind to which Mrs. Williams
was subjected, they would, given their average clientele, go out of
business within a short time, and that the result would be that no poor
old ladies on welfare would ever be able to bask in the barbaric
splendor of television or of stereo sound.0 2 Or the automobile in-
dustry might actually convince us that a serious modification of
warranty disclaimer practices would do what all their PR men have
been threatening us with for years: cut profits to such a degree that
average Americans would have to start walking again.
It seems to me, however, that a more fundamental objection may be
raised with respect to Professor Leff's point of view. It is, I submit,
plainly unrealistic to envisage a party accused of "unconsdonability,"
and given an opportunity to justify himself, as simply relying, by way
of such justification, on his overwhelming desire to make more money.
Max Greed2 3 is a character of purely operatic dimensions, and Pro-
fessor Leff's dramatic dialogues,20 4 invented to illustrate his argument,
sound like nothing so much as secco recitative. It may, I think, be safely
left to the "accused" (and his presumably sane counsel) to work out
whatever factual assertions are best made on his behalf; and factual
issues being thus raised, they will doubtless be joined, the resultant
259. Leff 546 (emphasis in original).
260. Id.
261. Espedally or perhaps exclusively insofar as such matters arc apparent to the
"victim" in the case.
262. I do not, incidentally, wish to suggest that such evidence would absolutely con-
dude the matter.
263. Professor LefF's prototypical businessman. Leff 544-45.
264. Id. 544-45.
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process being on the whole likely to engender, besides heat, a little
light as well. It is hardly beyond the capacity of normal intelligence to
develop a set of relevant questions. A good instance (indeed, the only
one available 265) is provided by the Elkins-Dcll cases, 2Q0 in which the
court, in remanding the cases for hearings on the issue of unconscion-
ability, outlined some of the issues to be explored:
... the financial positions of the bankrupts at the time the agree-
ments were entered into; the extent to which agreements of this
kind are customary among lenders like Fidelity; the extent to
which Fidelity's contracts vary with and reflect anticipated risks;
the availability of other credit to the bankrupts ... ; the extent to
which the various provisions were enforced by Fidelity or in-
fluenced the bankrupts' business conduct, particularly their ability
to secure other funds; whether the terms of these contracts fa-
cilitated commerce by making funds available where they other-
wise would not be or impeded commerce by precluding access to
other sources of funds; and the effects of holding these contracts
unenforceable in bankruptcy on the future financing of similar
businesses in need of funds.2 7
It is difficult to see why similar questions might not be formulated in
the sales context, whatever the particular inequity complained of may
be.
V. Conclusion
I have tried to show that Section 2-302 is more than mere incanta-
tion; that it has a number of "reality referents, " 208 and that it is not too
difficult, given an appropriate initial disposition and a little con-
centration, to flush those referents out of their thickets. To go to
great lengths to prove the opposite amounts in the end merely to a
demonstration of the self-evident: that "unconscionability" is a residual
category of shifting content and expansible nature. The thesis of this
265. In Frostifresh Corp. y. Reynoso, 52 Misc. 2d g6, 274 N.Y.S.2d 757 (1966), reo'dL
with respect to damages, 54 lisc. 2d 119, 281 N.Y.S.2d (1967), a hearing was apparently
held during the course of trial, and before the opinion was rendered; I have been unable
to obtain a transcript. Fairfield Lease Corp. v. Colonial Aluminium Sales Inc., 3 UCC
REP. SERV. 858 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966), and Central Budget Corp. v. Sanchez, 58 Misc. 2d 620,
279 N.Y.S.2d 391 (1967), were cases in which motions for summary judgments were denied
so that hearings might be held. I understand from privately supplied information that
the cases were settled before such hearings could take place. Settlement was also, It should
be noted, the eventual outcome of the Elkins-Dell litigation.
266. 253 F.Supp. 864 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
267. 253 F.Supp. at 874.
268. One of Professor Left's complaints is that it has none: Left 558.
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essay has been, of course, that we capnot do iwithout such regrettably
vague standards.
Professor Leff finishes with a trumpet-blast from Llewellyn. - 0 It is
an old and facile game to match quotations, but I shall indulge myself
nevertheless:
[I]n any intellectual enterprise.., there must always be a certain
difference between theory and practice or experience. A theory
must certainly be simpler than the factual complexity or chaos that
faces us when we lack the guidance which a general chart of the
field affords us. A chart or map would be altogether useless if it
did not simplify the actual contours and topography which it
describes.... No science offers us an absolutely complete account
of its subject matter. It is sufficient if it indicates some general
pattern to which the phenomena approximate more or less. For
practical purposes any degree of approximation will do if it will
lead to a greater control over nature than we should have without
our ideal pattern. But for theoretic purposes we need the postulate
that all divergences between the ideal and the actual will be pro-
gressively minimized by the discovery of subsidiary principles
deduced from, or at least consistent with, the principles of our
science.270o
269. Llewellyn's famous tag: "Covert tools are never reliable tools." It is, of course,quite dear that Llewellyn intended Section 2-502 to be a substitution of overtness for
covertness. Professor Lefs irony is, of course, intentional.
270. M. CoHEN, R.ASoN AN LAw 73-74 (Collier Books ed. 1950).
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